A VINDICATION OF Dr. HAMMOND'S *Addreſſe*, &c.

From the Exceptions of

EUTACTUS PHILODEMIUS,

IN TWO PARTICULARS.

Concerning { *The Power ſuppoſed in the Few, over his own Freedome.* / *The No-power over a mans own Life.*

TOGETHER WITH

A BRIEF *REPLY* TO

Mr. JOHN GOODWINS Ψευδονίκαι,

as far as concerns Dr. *HAMMOND.*

LONDON,

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A VINDICATION OF *Dr.* HAMMOND'S *Addreſſe, &c.*

§. 1. THe late Author of the *Original, and End of Civil Power*, under the name of *Eutactus Philodemius*, hath thought fit to queſtion two things ſet down by Doctor *Hammond* in his *Addreſſe to the General, and Counſel of War*. The firſt is this Affirmation, *That the Jew under Gods own Government might wholly give up himſelf, and his Freedome to his Maſters will (the power of life being onely exempted) and by having his eare bored, might of a Free-man become a Slave for ever.* pag. 5.

§. 2. The ſecond is this Queſtion, *Whether ever any man was by God or Nature inveſted with power over his own Life*, i. e. *to take away his own life, or to kill himſelf?* pag. 18.

§. 3. This *Affirmation*, and this *Queſtion*, he willingly acknowledges, and is content that the *Queſtion* ſhall be interpreted a down-right *Negaion*, *That never any man was by God or Nature inveſted with power over his own life, or power to kill himſelfe.* And having thus confeſt the citation, as farre as concerns him,

him, it remains that I proceed to juſtifie both parts of it. And to that end, I ſhall think my ſelf ſufficiently fortified by two advantages, which that *Author* hath been pleaſed to allow me in this matter.

§.4. Firſt, that it is not any opinion of Doctor *Hammond*, but the plain words of *Scripture*, which are, under his name, thus oppoſed by this Author in both places. The former is *in terminis*, *Exodus* 21. at the beginning. *If the ſervant ſhall plainly ſay, I love my Maſter, &c. I will not go out free, Then his Maſter ſhall bring him to the Judges, &c. And his Maſter ſhall bore his eare thorow with an awle, and he ſhall ſerve him for ever.* And again, *Deut.* 15. 16. *And it ſhall be, if he* (i. e. *the ſervant ſet free at the Sabbatick year*) *ſay unto thee, I will not go away from thee, &c. Then thou ſhalt take an awle, and thruſt it thorow his eare unto the door, and he ſhall be thy ſervant for ever; and alſo to thy hand-maid thou ſhalt do likewiſe.*

§.5. That a plain place of *Scripture* ſhould be thus miſtaken for an Aſſertion of Doctor *Hammond*, I am not permitted to ſuſpect, becauſe that *Author* hath to his mention of the Doctors Name added the teſtimony of *Gen.* 21. which, though it be a miſtake, I ſuppoſe, of the Printer, for *Ex.* 21. will yet be a competent teſtimony of that *Authors* opinion, that Doctor *Hammond* had *Moſes* on his ſide, and conſequently, that both were to be involv'd by him in the ſame condemnation.

§.6. The ſame, I ſuppoſe, I may aſſume of the other *Negation* queſtioned by him, that 'tis in Doctor *Hammond*, but the repeating of the 6. Commandment [*Thou ſhalt not kill*] according to the latitude wherein all Jewiſh and Chriſtian Writers have interpreted it to the prohibition of *ſelf-murder*, as hath been ſhewed by him at large in another place.

Pract. Cat. l. 2. ſect. 5.

§.7. Having mentioned this firſt *advantage* againſt this *Author*, ſufficient certainly to ſecure Doctor *Hammond* from his blame, and to make any *Apologie* for him unneceſſary, and well-nigh ſcandalous, (the *Word* of *God* being able to plead its own cauſe, without the aſſiſtance of any humane *Advocate*) I have yet the benefit of a ſecond kindneſſe allowed me by this unknown adverſary; which, though *Scripture* were not of Authority with him, would encourage the Doctor not to fear the falling under his

his diſpleaſure. That is, the unreconcileableneſſe of thoſe two opinions (the one with the other) which he is pleaſed to confront to Doctor *Hammond*, viz. that it ſhould be *unlawful* for a *Jew* to give up his *Freedome*, (and that *ſervitude* ſhould be, as he calls it, an *unnatural ſervitude*) and yet that it ſhould be put in his power by *God* and *Nature* (for that is to affirm it *lawful*, and agreeable to *Nature*) to take away his own *Life*, or to kill himſelf. For it being by *Job* mentioned as an *Aphoriſm* of common Nature, that a man will *for his life give all he hath*; and in the accounts and practiſes of all men, that of *Liberty* being part of that *all*; It will conſequently be unreaſonable, and impoſſible for him that hath once affirmed the parting with ones freedome to be an *unnatural ſervitude*, to deny the *killing of himſelf* to be an *unnatural murther*: And therefore, having ſo fair advantages before me, not onely the *Scripture in terminis* on my ſide, but this *Adverſary*, by ſo eaſie a conſequence, become my *Second* alſo, I am (not unwillingly) perſwaded to tender a brief reply to thoſe reaſons, which ſeem to have drawn this Author into this caſual diſpute; and to endeavour the preventing of thoſe Errours, to which, a *Philodemius*, or *popular* Diſputer may in ſuch an Age of *Licentiouſneſſe* betray others.

§.8. To the caſe of the *Jewiſh Servant*, giving up his *freedome* to his *Maſter*, (which was by the Doctor mentioned out of *Moſes*) the Author hath framed three *Anſwers*.

§. 9. The firſt, *That it cannot be affirmed upon good and pregnant grounds, that from Nature the Jew had any ſuch power, but that God only permitted it to be ſo; and the Jew, by this unnatural ſervitude to his Maſter, was a fit type of that ſlavery that man ſhould be in unto Sinne, to obey it in the luſts thereof; for his ſervants we are whom we obey.*

§.10. To this I *anſwer*, That the affirmation of *Moſes* in the Scripture, [That this was *permitted by God* to the *Jewes*] is to me a *good and pregnant ground* that the *Jew* had this power under *Gods own Gouernment*, which is all that he affirms to be affirmed by Doctor *Hammond* in that place; and therefore, the putting in thoſe other words [*Of the Jewes not having it from Nature*] ſeems to be on purpoſe deſigned to take off from the *clearneſſe*, and the *pregnancie* of the probation, and ſo onely

to darken, but not to invalidate the argument.

§. 11. But then ſecondly, I adde, that *Gods permitting* any thing to any man, is a *pregnant* argument, that from *Nature* that man *hath that power:* If by *Power* we mean a *moral power*, or *power* of doing it *without ſinne*; And if by *Gods permiſſion* we underſtand his *Approbation*, as of a lawful fact. For, thus it is certain, that *God* never ſo *permits*, as to *approve* (or not prohibite) any thing, which by the *Law of Nature* may not be done *without ſinne*. For the *Law of Nature* being the *Law of God*, as truly as any *poſitive Law* of his promulgating; and *God* in all his *Lawes* being conſtant to himſelf, ſo far as never to *prohibite*, and *permit* the ſame thing at the ſame time to the ſame men; It is moſt certain, that what *God* thus *permits*, *Nature permits* alſo, *i.e.* leaves it *lawful* to be done, or poſſible without *Sinne*.

§. 12. But if by *Permiſſion* this *Author* means no more then diſpenſation, or grant of preſent *Impunity*, ſuch as in the *Jewiſh* Common-wealth was (for the *hardneſſe of their hearts*) allowed in the buſineſſe of *Divorce*, or (for the multiplying of them) in *Polygamie*, then it will ſure reſt upon him to *prove*, and not only (as he ſaith) to *ſuppoſe*, that God thus (and thus only) permitted it to be ſo: But this I ſhall ſuppoſe impoſſible to be proved, though it cannot lie upon me to demonſtrate the *Negative*, nor ſhall I ſo much fear the probableneſſe of his unprov'd groundleſſe *ſuppoſition*, as to endeavour it. For indeed, what degree of *likeneſſe* is there betwixt thoſe *divorces* and *polygamies*, (which were ſuch inordinate *Liberties*) and this other of diveſting himſelf of *Liberty?* Only the ſame that is betwixt two *Contraries*.

§. 13. I ſhall not need further to inſiſt on this, both for the plain words of *Scripture*, and becauſe it is the acknowledgment of this very Author, *pag.* 18. *That this may lawfully be done for the obtaining of a greater good*; which being compared with *Rom.* 3. *ver.* 8. makes up a demonſtration, that a man hath this *power*, *i.e.* that he may *lawfully* do it. For 'tis not the intuition of the greateſt *moral good*, much leſſe of the greateſt *advantage* to my ſelf or any other, that may make that *lawful* which in it ſelf is *unlawful*, or which by *nature* man hath not *power* to do.

And

§. 14. And therefore, when he addes, [*That in this the Jew was a fit type of mans ſlavery to ſinne*] as 'twill be eaſily granted, that he was (as *type* ſignifies *Image* or *Embleme*) ſo ſure it will not prove that this *ſervitude* of the *Jew* was an *unnatural ſervitude*, any more then any other parts of the *Judaical* Law, (which either in the intention of the *Law-giver*, or by the wit of Man can be made an Image of any preſent ſtate or condition of men) can by that one Argument be proved to be *unnatural*. For, ſure all *types* are not by that one evidence of their being *types* demonſtrated to be *ſinful*, eſpecially when they are inſtituted or permitted by *God*, and by that appear to be agreeable to his *will*, in *oppoſition* to, or *variation* from which, all *ſinne* or *obliquity* conſiſts: Or if this charge muſt fall ſingly on this *Type*, but not on all others, (as ſure the *Paſſeover*, which was a *type*, was not yet *unnatural*, and ſo of the reſt) then muſt this charge be proved by ſome other *medium*, then by this onely, that it is a *Type*; and till that be produced, I muſt think this way of diſcourſe (which firſt ſuppoſes this giving up of the *Jewes Liberty* to be a *Type*, & then concludes it *unnatural* for being ſuch) to be the proving of *quidlibet ex quolibet*; the ſame with his, which firſt ſuppoſes a live man to be a Picture, and then ſends him a challenge for being ſuch: Certainly ſuch reaſoning is too very looſe, and light, to ſet any good *Character* on that cauſe that wants ſuch ſupporters.

§. 15. His ſecond anſwer is yet a little more ſtrange, and ſuch as could not yet eaſily have been foreſeen, or expected; That his having his *eare bored, was a puniſhment for his contempt of that Liberty, &c.* 'Tis ſufficiently known that this *boring of the eare* was the ceremony of receiving a *Servant* among the *Jewes*; and therefore, when *David* ſaith of Chriſt, *But mine eare haſt thou opened*, 'tis acknowledg'd, that thereby was denoted his *taking on him the form of a ſervant*. This *boring of the eare with an awle* was no very painful thing, ſure not ſo much as *Circumciſion*; and yet 'twould be a little ſtrange, that when a *Proſelite* was received among the *Jews* with *Circumciſion*, that ſhould be deemed a puniſhment on him for his not continuing a *Gentile*, or that his Converſion to Judaiſme, of which this was the *Ceremony*, ſhould be thereupon counted an unnatural Sinne: The *anſwering* ſuch Argu-

Arguments as theſe, would require a more chearful and pleaſant humour, then the *times*, or *occaſion* of theſe debates will well permit.

§.16. The laſt *Anſwer* looks a little more demurely, *That his giving himſelf up to be a ſlave for ever, did referre to, and terminate in the year of Jubilee, &c. and that he did not make himſelf irrecoverably a ſlave, &c.* [*That this was to terminate in the yeare of Jubilee*] is ſaid without farther proof, then only of this unteſtified affirmation in a *parentheſis*, *That that was the year of his freedome from that ſervitude which the corruption of his own will had brought upon him:* which is the *proving* a thing by a bare *repeating* of it in other words, and onely throwing a little *dirt* upon it. For how doth it appeare that it is a piece of *Corruption* (for a man that *loves his Maſter*, as the Text ſaith, and is better pleaſed with his ſervice, then with his former liberty) thus to chooſe that which he likes beſt? Or how comes the *caſting off Liberty* to be a *corruption of the will*, when *caſting off yokes*, and *ſervitude*, is made capable of ſo good a *character?* Had the words of Saint *Paul*, ſpeaking of ſervants, [*If thou canſt be free, uſe it rather*] been brought to back this *bare Aſſertion*, there had been ſome tolerable excuſe for ſuch a begging of the *queſtion* as this: But thoſe words extend not to a *command*, that every man ſhould be obliged to be *free*, that can, but only to a *permiſſion*, that, if he will rather uſe it (*i.e.* preferre this *Liberty*) he moſt lawfully, and commendably may. But this Author hath not thought fit to make this interpretation, or account of that place neceſſary to be given him. As for the truth of his *Affirmation*, that this *Bondman with his eare bored, was releaſed at the year of Jubilee*, 'tis that, which, as it doth not well conſiſt with the words of *Moſes*, [*He ſhall ſerve him for ever*] *Exod.*21.6. & *Deut.* 15. 17. ſo it is not proved by any other place, or made probable that [*for ever*] is not an *abſolute* [*for ever.*] One place in *Leviticus*, there is, *Chap.*25.41. which ſaith, that the *poor Brother* that is ſold to be a *bond-ſervant*, *ſhall be free at the year of Jubilee*, and proportionably the *ſervant* (ſpoken of by me in *Exodus* & *Deuteronomy*) is to be ſet free from that *ſervitude*, to which he was *ſold*, (*i.e.* the *forced* and *conſtrein'd*, not purely *voluntary ſervitude*) in the *ſeventh*, or *ſabbatick* year, and ſo by the ſame reaſon

in

in the *Jubilee*, which is the great *Sabbatick* (made up of ſeven times ſeven) in the place of *Leviticus*.

§. 17. But this Author muſt mark, that this perſon thus ſet *free*, is not the *Jew* of whom Doctor *Hammond* ſpake, but the other that hath made the *voluntary ſurrender* of his *Liberty*, he that when the *Sabbatick* yeare comes (or conſequently the yeare of *Jubilee*, which offers him the ſame releaſe) reſolves, that he will *not go out free*, refuſes to make uſe of the advantage of a *Jubilee*, and ſo hath no more releaſes behind; and conſequently by this act of his is in an *irreverſible eſtate*, remains *a ſervant for ever*. And ſo this more ſpecious *anſwer* appears to have as little of truth, or ſubſtance in it, as the two former.

§. 18. To which, yet I might further adde, That in caſe it were granted, that the next year of *Jubilee* gave this man releaſe alſo, yet would not this avoid the concludency of this place for the *lawfulneſſe of giving up our liberty* (which is the only point in hand) becauſe he that can do it for *ſeven*, or for *fifty* yeares, can ſurely do it: and although having done it, he ſhall have *Liberty*, after that number of years, to *retract*, if he pleaſe, yet is this no *obligation* that he *ſhall* retract, but only a priviledge that he *may*; which priviledge he may again as lawfully deny himſelfe to make uſe of, as before he did of his firſt *Liberty*.

§. 19. Mean while the *concluſion*, or cloſe of this *Authors* reaſoning is a little more *extraordinary* yet. For having from (the κόφον φαρμακὸν of) the *Jubilee*, inferr'd that *he did not make himſelf irrecoverably a ſlave*, he proceeds. [And if ſo (*i.e.* ſure, if he made not himſelf a ſlave *irrecoverably*) *where is the warrant from God, or Nature, for paſſing away his freedome, or Liberty at all? and if ſo, how without recall, and irreverſibly?*] Is it poſſible this Author could think theſe Concluſions demonſtrated ſo *logically*, as that he ſhould ſet them down by way of *queſtion*, which ſuppoſes them irrefragable at the firſt asking?

§. 20. For the firſt of them, is not the *contrary* moſt demonſtrable? that if he were a *ſlave* till the year of *Jubilee*, (as 'tis confeſt he was, and withal that he was ſo by *Gods permiſſion*) then there is *warrant from God for paſſing away his Liberty in ſome* degree,

and for ſome ſpace, though not irrevocably. Doth not he ſerve at all, that ſerves not *eternally?* or is that no warrant at all, which is ſuch for a limited time only? Then ſure are we not at all *permitted* to be men, or *warranted* by *God* or *Nature* to live in this world, becauſe we have our *Jubilee* too, our time of *manumiſſion* from hence.

§. 21. And for the ſecond, what is that but a plain *Circle*, firſt to inferre the [*not at all*] from the [*not irrevocably*] and then in ſame breath, the [*not irrevocably*] from the [*not at all.*] How reconcileable this is with the Authours *popular* title of *Philodemius*, I diſpute not; but reſolve, it is not the particular merit which beſtowed on him that other more *regular* of *Eutactus*.

§. 22. And for the dexterity that is expreſt in the concluſion of the whole ſection, [*That therefore, that abſolute and unreſerved reſignation of a mans native Liberty, &c. without any juſt condition, or adequate change*, (which, ſaith he, is hereby pleaded for by the Doctor) *can have no riſe or origination from God, or reaſonable nature*] (impoſing on the *Doctor*, directly againſt his ſenſe, thoſe words of ſo irrational importance, [*without any juſt condition, or adequate exchange*] I ſhall ſuppoſe that this was an effect of the neceſſary wants of his cauſe, and a diſcreet previſion that his Concluſion could not ſubſiſt without ſuch *ſupplies*, which made him venture on ſuch indirect means.

§. 23. For Doctor *Hammond* is not ſuch an enemy to mankinde, as to plead for ſuch *irrational* actings, or to become his advocate that makes imprudent, or *unthrifty* bargaines, (though by the ſtrength of his *free will to evil*, he may poſſibly do ſo ſometimes, and be obliged by his own act, and juſtly ſuffer the inconveniences, and ſmarts of it) but reſolveth, that both the *Campanians* in their *dedition*, and the *Barbarians* in their requeſt to the *Romans*, that they might have leave to become their *ſervants*; and the *Jew* in *Moſes*'s ſuppoſition, that *loved his maſter*, and preferr'd his *ſervice* before his *manumiſſion*, (I ſhall adde my ſelfe alſo, who profeſſe to prefer (in my choice for my ſelf) *ſubjection* before abſolute *Liberty*, nay before *Soveraignty* it ſelf; and believe it a farre more *ſober*, and conſequently *rational* ſpeech in *Saul*, 1 *Sam.* 9. 21. which expreſt ſome aver-

averſation to *Samuels* propoſal about *anointing* him, then that other of *Abſolons*, *O that I were a Judge, or King, &c.*) did all part with their *Liberty* upon *adequate exchanges*, ſuch, as they (which were the fitteſt judges what themſelvs thought) did conceive to be the full *worth* of the commodity they parted with: And ſuch a *rational* power of parting with abſolute *Liberty* for ſomewhat that I like better, (*i. e.* for *ſubjection* to *Government*, which is, 1. in it ſelf, farre removed from *ſlavery*; and 2. is the onely way to *ſecure* men from the *danger* of it) is all that that *Addreſſe* had occaſion to aſſert, or plead for at that time.

§. 24. One thing more there is, which I may be allowed to add, (having thus far reply'd to all his anſwers) that the concluſion which was in the *Addreſſe* inferr'd from that practice of the *Jews*, was farther confirm'd by the practice of diverſe *Heathens*, who can neither be excuſed by the pretence of a *permiſſion*, or ſpeciall *diſpenſation* from *God* to doe unnaturall things (as he thinks may be affirmed of the *Jew*) nor yet were obſerved by the moſt rational *Hiſtorians* to have done any thing contrary to *Reaſon* or *Nature*, in changing abſolute Liberty for ſomwhat which ſeemed better, and more advantagious to them, to wit, for ſecurity, and *protection*, *i.e.* in changing a ſtate of common *hoſtility*, (the unhappieſt lot in nature) for that other (ſet down by the *Apoſtle* as the object of their Chriſtian * *purſuite*, and *emulation*, and * *contention*) a quiet ſetled *peace*. The advantage of which change, he that is not inclined to acknowledge, muſt be of a temper of *minde* or body ſo diſtant from that which *God* hath given me, that I ſhall not wonder, that that which ſeemes to me moſt demonſtractively aſſerted, is to him ſo farre from being acknowledged ſuch. I ſhall adde no more to the vindicating of the firſt propoſition, till I meet with the *temptation* of better, or more dangerous *arguments* againſt it.

* διώκετε εἰρήνην. * φίλοτιμεῖσθε ἡσυχάζειν.

§. 25. I proceed as briefly to the ſecond, which is propoſed in the *Addreſſe* by way of *queſtion*, *Whether ever any man was by God, or Nature, inveſted with power of his own Life*, i. e. *with power to take away his own Life, to kill himſelfe?* The vindicating of which, I muſt acknowledge a taske, to which I did not expect that the Doctor ſhould be call'd; having not, till now, been ſo fully convinced of the danger, and

ill consequences of favouring the excesses of those mens wits, who have maintained *paradoxes*, or of the improvidence of those that have tempted others by the publishing of them.

§. 26. For certainly about two years since, before the time, that the *posthumous* Βιαθάν: was set out, a man might in this Nation have adventur'd to have asked so calme a *question* [*whether a man might Lawfully kill himself?*] and not have feared a challenge in *print* for this injury, or encroachment upon the liberty of our *Nature*. And I conceive those Lawes of our Land, which have look'd on this *selfe-slaughter* as an inhumane crime, and punish'd it after *Death*, with the deniall of *Christian buriall*, & a marke of reproach upon the *grave*, might, when time was, have been able to have come in to the assistance of so known a *truth*; had not the sacred rites of *Christian buriall* been now so despised, and profaned, that the wanting them hath ceased to be esteemed a punishment among us; had not the Custome of *killing* other men so haras's'd our consciences, and obliterated all the remainders of written, and unwritten *Lawes*, that we need not be wondred at, if the *swords*, which have been so flesht abroad, mistake their way somtimes, & return on the owners breasts. And lastly, had not the deduction been so prone, and easie from the *General*, to the *particulars*, from the *Lawfulnesse* of a *Nations* destroying *it selfe*, to a *single persons* going and doing likewise, from the justifying of *civil* intestine slaughters of the *publike*, to that other more tolerable crime of a *single violence*.

§. 26. As it is, I shall not endeavour to perswade my selfe (as the *Pyrrhonian* in *Sextus Empiricus* would teach me to do) that I was in a dream, when I read D. *Hammond* cited, and confuted for thus affirming? I must rather provide for the encounter, and hasten to *answer* the *arguments*, which this Author hath offered against this branch of the sixth *Commandment* (as he met with it in the Doctors hands) or else 'twil be possible this opinion may gather *Proselytes* also in this age, wherein nothing can be said so incredible, which some men doe not make a shift to take up, and believe very contentedly.

§. 27. His first argument is drawne from the Doctors concession, that *man hath power from God and Nature over his owne body*

body to cut and lance it, and over his owne freedome to paſſe it away; from whence, if he doe any thing, he muſt undertake to conclude, that *therefore he hath power over his life* alſo; And to do that, he muſt make good theſe three things:

§. 28. 1. That ſince the confutation of the former propoſition, he hath now chang'd his minde, and agrees with Doctor *Hammond*, that a man hath from *God* or *Nature power* over *his freedome to paſſe it away*, (for otherwiſe, though it will be an advantage againſt Doctor *Hammond*, who *confeſt* it, yet will it not be of uſe to himſelf who profeſſeth the contrary) and again, that he hath forgotten what in his very laſt period he had affirmed, [*that God doth not intruſt and allow any man to have power to deſtroy his own image*, i. e. *to take away mans life, but him, or them whom he makes Gods*, i. e. *Magiſtrates to whom he deputes his own place*] for ſure it cannot be thought, that every *private man* in the *community* of *Nature*, is ſuch a *Vicegerent of God*, or *Magiſtrate*.

§. 29. 2. That the *argument*, *à minori ad majus affirmativè*, is valid, againſt all *Logick*, viz: That he that hath power over the *body*, or over *freedome*, is ſuppoſed to have *power over Life alſo*; and ſo that the *Surgeon*, that may ſcarifie the fleſh, or *cut* off an Arme, may therefore as Lawfully *ſlaſh* the throate, and *cut off* the *head* alſo; and in like manner that the Maſter, by being ſuch, is become the *Judge* of his Servant, and hath among *Chriſtians* that *power* of his *Life*, which he hath ſeldom been allowed among the worſt of Heathens.

§. 30. And 3. That *God*, which hath put ſomething in our power, is thereby obliged to reſerve nothing to himſelf; Or that by giving us the *uſus fructus*, or benefits of Life, he hath given us the abſolute *dominion*, and propriety of it alſo.

§. 31. But without either of theſe three more difficult undertakings, the *Author* hath attempted an eaſier way, by ſuppoſing that neither *cutting of fleſh*, nor *Parting with freedome may be endured by God or Nature, unleſſe they referre to ſuch an end, whereby a farre greater good is to be enjoyed, and obtained: that cutting or lancing (without this neceſſary circumſtance of a greater good) is a ſtep or degree toward ſelf-murther*, &c. From whence the *Concluſion*, I ſuppoſe, muſt be, that by the ſame reaſon the *Killing* of ones *ſelf*, may then alſo be conceiv'd allowable by *God*, when

it is referr'd by me to ſuch an *end*, whereby a far *greater good is to be enjoyed*, and *obtained*, but never elſe.

§. 32. To which I ſhall make theſe clear Replyes, 1. That a thing directly *forbidden* by God, cannot be thought approveable by him, upon the referring of it to a *morall* (much leſſe if it be but an *advantagious* or *profitable*) *good* end. *Their damnation is juſt, that ſay, they may doe evill that good may come.* And that this is not a *begging* of the *queſtion*; but that, indeed, *ſelf-homicide* is evill, and forbidden by *God*, will be clear by remembring theſe three things, 1. That the command of not *killing*, is *indefinite*; and that he that *kils himſelf*, doth certainly *kill*, that he that *ſheds his own blood*, *ſheds* the *blood* of a *Man*: and 2. That the *Image of God* reſiding on him (which is the *ground* of this prohibition in *Moſes*, *Gen.9.* 6.) is as truly ſo, when 'tis beheld in the *reflexion*, as when in the *direct line*, in my ſelf, as in any other man. 3. That the power of *Life* is *reſerved* a peculiar to *God*, and not communicated to the Creature, (ſave onely to his *Vice-gerent*) which may thus appear. *God* as the *Creator* of the World, & ſole doner of *life*, muſt be acknowledged to have the *dominion* over it: This *dominion* conſequently is *communicated* to none but to thoſe to whom by *God* it is *communicated*; To the *Magiſtrate* this *power* is given by that Law of *God*, whereby he preſcribes the putting certain Malefactors to *Death*; and whereby he conſtitutes the *Magiſtrate* his *Vice-gerent* on Earth, and ſo the *executioner* of that *Law*, *an avenger for wrath*, *Rom.*13. And whoſoever will challenge the like *power*, muſt ſhew the like *charter* and evidence; and if he cannot doe that, that is ſufficient to prove that he *hath* it not; As 'tis ſufficient to *convict* any man of the injuſtice of any *his* claime to *my* eſtate, that he cannot ſhew any *deed* whereby it was convey'd to *him* from *me*; And there need no other *Affirmative* proof againſt ſuch an one, then that it was *once* in *me*, and it appears not how it parted from me to any other. And therefore, till ſome *evidence* be produced, (which I ſuppoſe will never be) that *this power* of *life* is made over from *God* to every *private* man, the demonſtration is abundantly clear, that that *power* is not in any *private* man any more over *himſelf* then *others*. And it is obſervable to *this* very purpoſe, that though the *Stoicks*, to teach their Diſciples *apathy*, or courage againſt

againſt whatſoever events, did talk of that ſure remedy againſt all temporal preſſures, the *going out*, or *killing themſelves*, (looking on it favourably as a *refuge* or *ſanctuary* from all thoſe things which might otherwiſe be phanſied unſupportable) yet when they conſidered it this other way, (as every thing, they ſaid, had *two handles*) *i. e.* in reſpect of *God*, who placed them here; it was generally reſolved by them, *viz.* by *Seneca*, and the wiſeſt of them, (and the more fooliſh of that Sect are ſeldome found to *practiſe* the contrary) that we muſt not on our own heads *deſert* our *ſtation*, but maintain that ground on which our *General* hath ſet us, and wait with courage and patience, till he think fit to command us off again. As for the other two, power over the *fleſh*, and the *freedome*, the *cutting* of one, and *parting* with the other, they are no degrees toward the taking away *life*, but on the contrary are uſed on purpoſe for the preſerving of it, in its being, or well being, the one by the rules of phyſick, the other of policie; and therefore is the power of thoſe allowed us by God and Nature, becauſe they are thus inſtrumental to that end, and ſubmitted to our diſcretion, becauſe they may be ſo. Thus are ſome things referred to the *Stewards* judgment, and put into his *power*, to *diſpoſe* of for the good of the Family, and yet others *reſerv'd* peculiar, and *ſacred* in the *Maſters* own hands. Thus are my *Writings* put into my *Lawyers* hand, for him to uſe to the preſerving of my *Eſtate*; yet is not my *Eſtate* put into his *power* to diſpoſe of it at his pleaſure for ſome greater end. And the argument would be very infirm, becauſe that *power* which the *Steward* or *Lawyer* hath intruſted to him, ought not to be uſed by him, but in order to ſome *good end*; that therefore, that which is not ſo *entruſted* to him, may be thus aſſumed alſo. Some *rayes* there have alwayes been communicated from Heaven to this Earth of ours; and yet ſome *Flowers* of that celeſtial *Crown*, which have been reſerved as *ſacred*, and *incommunicable*. And ſo there will be no kind of weight or concludencie in this preſent way of *arguing*, this *ballancing* of *fleſh* or *liberty* with *Life*, till it appear alſo from the *ſame*, or equal *evidence*, that thoſe are *reſerved* by *God*, as Life appears to be. This certainly, without any more help, is a full ſatisfaction to this argument.

But

§. 33. But then ſecondly, *& ex abundanti*, the *Killing my ſelf* is no way ordinable to *good*. 1. 'Tis not ordinable to mine own *preſent worldly advantage*, as *lancing*, and *ſubjection* may be, that is cleare; and that is a reaſon why *God* ſhould not give us this *Liberty*, (though if we were not able to render *reaſons*, the *wiſdome* of the Law-giver were *reaſon* enough) Aud for *future* advantages to *my ſelf*, the *being with Chriſt*, which is *farre better*, 1. that cannot be taken notice of by bare *Nature*, till that be *Chriſtianized:* and then, 2. according to the *Chriſtians* rules, we have all reaſon to reſolve that 'twill not be purchas'd by any other way, but by that which *God* hath preſcribed toward it, *i.e.* by lawful unprohibited courſes. It being evident, that the *Crown* which is held in *Gods* hand ſhall not be diſpenced to any, but thoſe which do *νομίμως ἀθλεῖν ſtrive lawfully*; and that *patience* of waiting til *God* cals, is one of the Lawes that are thus preſcribed in our *ἀγῶνες*.

§. 34. As for advantages to *others*, the *Publike-weal*, or *peace*, 'tis not imaginable, how the *killing my ſelf* can be directly, or otherwiſe then by accident, ordinable to that; whatſoever can be conceived of it, will be as ſufficiently *provided* for by the *Magiſtrates* having *power of life*; and that he may have from *God* immediately, as well as he can be ſuppoſed to have it from any act of collation from *me*, if 'twere in my *power*.

§ 35. Laſtly, For any *moral*, or Chriſtian virtue, or yet farther, the *illuſtrating* of the Glory of our *Creator*, (which alone deſerve the title of *good ends*) 'tis not the having an *unlimited power*, that *immediately*, or *directly* contributes to theſe, but the making *uſe* of the *limited powers* we have, the *imploying* the *lives* which he hath given us, according to his *will*, and not the *deſtroying* them *contrary* to it, I ſhall not need to proſecute this. All that is in this place pretended by the Author to this purpoſe, is onely this, that *a man may freely conſent, and willingly expoſe his life to death for a greater, or publiker good.*

§. 36. Where by *conſenting* I ſhall ſuppoſe him to mean a *conſent* of the *will* to that action which immediately follows, *i.e.* to the *expoſing his life to death*, (and if by *conſent* he ſhould mean any thing elſe, as the *conſenting* that the other ſhall *kill* him, or the making it *free* and *lawfull* to that other to take away his *Life*, then

then hath he put two very diſtant things together, and ſo'tis but the ordinary fallacy *plurium interrogationum*; and in that Notion of *Conſenting* I ſhall anon ſhew that man *may not*, i. e. hath not *power* ſo to *Conſent*.) And to the proving of this, it is, that his remaining endeavours (as far as concerns Doctor *Hammond*) are directed. And accordingly he ſaith, *He will be ſo bold as to ſtate the Queſtion as it ought*, i.e. to remove it from the words and ſence wherein Doctor *Hammond* propoſed it (and in which it is that his whole diſcourſe is grounded) to thoſe other words of his own, moſt extreamly diſtant in *ſound* and *ſence*; and in which I am as confident that the truth is on his ſide, (if *Conſent* ſignifie no more then I take it to ſignifie) as I am, that that truth doth not contradict thoſe other truths, which by Doctor *Hammond* are ſuperſtructed on his foundation; or that the *Propoſition*, as 'tis ſtated by the Doctor, is all that is neceſſary to be affirm'd for the founding of the reſt of his diſcourſe.

§. 37. For I deſire to know, whether there be no difference betwixt *killing my ſelf*, and *expoſing my life to death?* If ſo, then it muſt be not only *lawful* ſo to *kill my ſelf*, (which is all the Author demands) but ſometimes an act of *duty*, and *neceſſity* alſo: For ſo certainly, in the aſſiſting my *Soveraign*, or *Country*, to *hazard* and *expoſe* my life, when I am thereto lawfully called; and ſo again, to *ſuffer Martyrdome* in the confeſſion of *Chriſt*, or diſcharge of any Chriſtian duty, is not only *lawful* for me to doe, but I *ſinne* if I do it not. And yet I doe not perceive that this *Authour* hath laid this obligation, or neceſſity on himſelf, or any man elſe in any caſe to *kill* (or lay *violent hands* upon) himſelfe, and ſo I ſuppoſe he is ſtill of the Doctors minde, (though he be willing to conceale it) that there is a *difference* between theſe.

§. 38. And if there yet want any farther light to the clearing of this difference between this [*having power of my own life* ſo as to *kill my ſelf*] and that [*having power of my life*, ſo as to *expoſe* it, or venture it in a *good Cauſe*] I ſhall (for the concludeing of this Paper) propoſe the plaine difference betweene them.

§. 39. And that may be taken from the nature of the word [*expoſing*] for that we know ſignifies no more, then to ſubmit

it to an *hazard*, and ſo to *expoſe* my *Life*, is to *hazard* my Life: In doing ſo, all that can be affirm'd of me, is no more then this, that I am *willing* or *content* (and by my actions expreſſe that willingneſſe) to loſe my life, if *God* pleaſe to permit it to be taken from me.

§. 40. When my *life* is thus loſt, three things muſt neceſſarily concurre to it, 1. The *Violence* of the invader; 2. The *Providence of God* permitting him to invade; and 3. My *not reſiſting*, or my not uſing the meanes (which were naturally poſſible for me to uſe) to prevent, or avoid the violence of this *invaſion*, as when *Chriſt* might have uſed *Angels* (and another *flight*, and a third *compliance*, and *caution*) ebut chooſeth not to doe ſo. Of theſe three the onely *efficient cauſe* of the action (of *killing*) is the malicious violent *invader*; ſure neither the *providence* of *God* in *permitting*, nor my own *meekneſſe*, or *obedience* to *Chriſt* in *following* him, though it be to the very *Croſſe*.

§. 41. In this caſe, ſuppoſing that it be for a *good End* that I now *expoſe* my life, it is alſo ſuppoſed, that the purſuance of that end is either *duty* in me, a thing that I am abſolutely bound to, as the *Confeſſion* of *Chriſt*, &c. or elſe that tis *exceſſe* of *Charity*, to which, though it be not under *particular* precept, yet the intuition of ſome great and *glorious* end doth ſo *invite* and incline me, that 'tis *heroicall Virtue* in me to doe it, and that which (though *God* doth not ſo require it of me, as that I *ſinne*, if I doe it not, yet) he hath promiſed to *reward abundantly*, whenſoever 'tis done *for his ſake*.

§. 42. In the former of theſe caſes, when the purſuance of that *good end* is *ſtrict dutie*, as in caſe I am commanded to *confeſſe Chriſt*, or to aſſiſt my *Prince* in protecting my Country, There as my endeavour is required of me by that *precept*, ſo is my *utmoſt* endeavour, ſuch as I muſt not remit, whatſoever the *danger* be; And if that *danger* prove to be the *utmoſt danger*, even of my *life* it ſelf, yet the *command* of *Conſtancie*, of not *fearing* or *fainting*, and the Character of *perfect love* given by Saint *John*, that it *caſts out fear*, and the denuntiations againſt the *fearfull* or *cowardly*, doe all joyn to extend my Obligation to purſue this ſo neceſſary *End* without any receding, and if the *Croſſe* it ſelf lie in my way toward this end, to *take it up*, i. e. willingly to

ſubmit

ſubmit to *Gods* Providence, which hath thought fit to call me to this *Triall*, if it be even of *reſiſting unto bloud*. And ſo ſtill all that I doe, is the *conſtant, patient, chearfull ſubmiſſion* to *Gods* Will (in his *providentiall diſpoſing* of my life, and in *permitting* the injurious to take it from me) and nothing elſe; in abſolute choice of *Obedience*, but not of *Death*; a ſacrificing to duty all *deſire* of *Life*, but not otherwiſe undertaking to diſpoſe of it.

§. 43. Hence is it that my *venturing* of my *Life* doth not clear, or free the *Invader*, from any degree of ſinne, or guilt in thus taking it away from me. 'Twas but a *Sarcaſme* or *Trope* in *Julians* Souldiers, to ſay, they did not wrong the *Chriſtians* by *killing* them, but onely haſten them to their deſired home: And the *Fathers* were able to anſwer the *Paralogiſme* by the rule in *Ethickes*, diſtinguiſhing betwixt a *mixt*, and *abſolute will*; and ſo concluding their *ſlaughters* to be *Injuries*, though they were willingly embraced; the *Perſecutors* to be *Perſecutors* ſtill, though the other were *Martyrs*.

§. 44. Which is a *demonſtrative* proof, that 'tis the *Invader*, not *Sufferer*, whoſe *act* the killing is ſuppoſed to be, and ſo that I am not in this caſe of *expoſing my Life*, ſuppoſed to give any *Conſent* that he ſhall *kill* me, or conſequently to diveſt my ſelf of the *power* of my *Life*, or indeed to have any ſuch *power* over it. For whatſoever is abſolute in my *power* to *diſpoſe* of, that I may lawfully conſent to part with; That if I doe part with it, *ipſo facto*, and *jure* * becomes his, to whom I part with it (and if there be any error in it, 'tis chargeable on the *giver*, who was thus profuſely liberall above the proportion:) And conſequently for him to take and uſe it, is in *him* no ſinne; As that part of my Eſtate which is in my power, may by me be paſt over to another by *gift*, and being ſo, is lawfully *poſſeſt* and enjoy'd by the *receiver*.

* *Data eo ipſo quo dantur, fiunt accipientis.* Juriſt.

§. 45. And therefore, I ſay, if the lawfulneſſe of the *expoſing* my Life would conclude me to have a *power* over it, it muſt be as perfectly lawfull for the *Tyrant*, into whoſe hands my *Life* (in the *confeſſing* of *Chriſt*) is by me expoſed, to take that *Life* from me, as 'tis for the poor man into whoſe hands my *goods* are by *me* put (in obedience to *Chriſts* command of *mercifulneſs*) to receive

and *carry* away thoſe *goods*; which being an abſurdity too groſſe to be defended by any, will, I ſuppoſe, incline this Author to diſcern the diſtance betwixt the queſtions, as the *one* is by him, and as the *other* was by Doctor *Hammond* propoſed.

§. 46. And in like manner alſo, when the End purſued by me, is (though not abſolutely *neceſſary*, yet) *better* and *more excellent*; there the Precept of being *faithful* unto *death*, and the *promiſe* of *reward* made to him that layes down, or *loſes his life for Chriſts ſake*, do as much oblige to *conſtancy*, at leaſt, as much aſſure that ſuch *conſtancy* ſhall be acceptable to *God*, (and that the more by how much greater the *hazards*, and *terrours*, and *temptations* are to the contrary) as when the particular matter of the action was nnder *precept*. And ſo that other *accidental* difference will make no variation in the main, nor make it at all probable, that *expoſing* my life *heroically* was not warranted by *God*, when *expoſing* it *neceſſarily*, was ſuppoſed to be ſo: it being as certain that *God* doth *warrant* me to do that which he *commends*, as what he ſtrictly *commands* to me: And therefore what was ſaid in the caſe of *duty*, doth as truly hold (and ſo needs not to be repeated again) in this caſe of [*more excellent*] alſo.

§. 47. Having thus far proceeded, it will now be unneceſſary for me to anſwer the *Arguments* which this *Author* addes in this matter; becauſe the *Queſtion* being by him changed from that which was propoſed by Doctor *Hammond* (and ſtated *Negatively*) to another, which no man can be more ready to *affirm* and aſſert then that Doctor; It would be an impertinent niceneſs in him to refuſe to have his Opinion confirmed by another mans reaſons; I ſhall rather wiſh that all his proofs were demonſtrative, and *effectual* to conclude, what Doctor *Hammond* affirms with him; and only briefly ſhew, that they are *ineffectual* to prove what that Doctor *denies*, and that will ſoon be done by the moſt curſory mention of them.

§. 48. For firſt, I grant with him that *God permitted his own Sonne to be put to death by the hands of violent and unjuſt men*; but ſee no *conſequence* from thence, that *Chriſt* as a Man might lawfully have *taken away* his own *Life*: As for the phraſe of *laying down the life for the ſheep*, that ſure ſignifies not the *killing himſelf*, (for

(for the *goodneſſe* of the *Shepheard* conſiſts not in that) the cutting his own throat, when the *Wolfe* invades the Flock; but the making uſe of his *Life* to the utmoſt, wherein it may be *advantageous* to the *Sheep*, and *venturing* and hazarding it in their defence or quarrel; yea, and contentedly ſuffering (not acting in) his own *death*, that he may be able to avert theirs. For this is the meaning of τιθέναι ψυχὴν, to *lay down* the life, (παραβολεύεσθαι εἶναι, *to venture himſelf voluntarily into danger*, παραβολεύεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ, in the notion in which the *Greek Gloſſaries* explain the phraſe, from παράβολος, *i.e.* ἐπικινδυνεύων in *Heſychius*, and the *Latine*, *Parabolanum animæ ſuæ eſſe*, *i.e.* all one with ἐκβάλλειν) to *expoſe* it, not to be *ſolicitous* for the *defence* of it, as to forgoe *duty*, or *charity*, or care of the poor *ſheep* intruſted to him, for the preſerving of it.

§. 49. A ſecond Argument is by this *Author* touched on, (though not formally urged by him) that the *preſerving whole ſocieties from periſhing*, *is a good and a publike end*; *and that the impunity of offenders being the readieſt way to the diſſolution and deſtruction of ſocieties*, *Nature is ſuppoſed to dictate that one man ſhould rather juſtly die*, *than whole ſocieties unjuſtly periſh*. This Concluſion, and Premiſſes, the Doctor doth, as the Author foreſaw, moſt willingly acknowledge, but withall diſcerns not how it proves that a man hath *power over his own life*: it will be ſufficient if *God* by any other meanes (as by inſtating it in the *Prince*, &c.) do place that *power of life* in others. The utmoſt which this way of arguing can pretend to conclude, is, 1. That whatſoever anyman hath in his *own power*, that 'tis reaſonable for him to deliver up into the *Governors hand*, (thus to make it eaſie or poſſible to diſcharge his *truſt*, & by theſe advantages to contribute to the publike quiet & weal.) Nay 2. that *God* that hath the *power of life*, and ſees how *uſeful* 'tis to have that veſted in *Governours*, ſhould conſequently be ſuppoſed ſo to veſt it, (And that he doth ſo, is the clear acknowledgment of the *Addreſſe*.)

§. 50. But ſure it cannot extend ſo far, as to make a man *give* (or *have*) that which he *hath* not, nor to reſtrain *God* from having the ſole *original* power of that, which otherwiſe might be acknowledged to be veſted in him.

§. 51. As for the *ſuppoſition* which the *Author* here adds on the

back of this, [*In case ten men in the communitie of Nature chose one to rule over them, and one of them thus spontaneously subjected shall murther one of his fellow Subjects*] (*whereupon he demands whether the Ruler so set up, may not by his own consent by virtue of that power he received from him among the rest, put such a murtherer to death.*) To this I answer, that the *Governour* may in this case *put the Murtherer to death*, but this not by *virtue* of anie *power* or *consent* of the Murtherer, but by *authoritie* from *God*, who alone hath the *power of Life*; In relation to which it is that the *Governour* is stiled διάκονος θεοῦ, *a Minister of God*, in this very notion, as he is ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργὴν, *an avenger for wrath* or *punisher* of offenders.

§. 52. That which is in the *Subjects power* the *Governour* may have by the Subjects *consent*, and by *virtue* of the *power which he received from him*; And therefore it is that the *power* of *violent resisting* invaders, the right of *repelling force by force*, which *God* and *Nature* hath given the *single* man in *communitie* of *Nature*, is now, in case of submission to the *Governour*, parted with, and depositted by him, so far as refers to the *Governour*; and though it be founded in *self-defence*, yet he that thus violently resists *the powers*, shall *receive to himself damnation.*

§. 53. But still that which is not in the *Subjects power*, is not, nay cannot be vested by the *Subject* in the *Governour*, but flowes from an higher principle (from him that really hath the *power*) and comes from the *Subjects consent*, onely as from the *causa sine quâ non*, or by way of *resultance*; That as *God* communicates not this *power* of life to any but the *Governour*; so that mans *Consent*, that he should be his *Governour*, doth remotely (and by way of *condition*, or *qualifying* of the Subject to a capacitie of receiving that *power* from *God*) concur to the vesting of that *power* in that person. Thus doth the *temper* of the aire contribute to the qualifying the *slime*, or putrid matter to receive *influences* from the *Sunne*, and then those *influences* beget *life* in it, and endow it with that higher principle, which the *temper* of the *aire*, that contributed all it could, (having not thus much in its *power*) could not be affirm'd to *contribute* to it.

§. 54. And so you see the Doctors way of stating this question doth as fully provide for the *punishing of Malefactors*, and pre-

preſerving of communities, as the ſuppoſing the power *of life to proceed* originally from the *People*, would be able to doe; As he that affirmes the *Soul* in every birth to be *infuſed* by *God*, makes as ſure a proviſion for *Generation*, and conſequently for the *preſervation* of the humane *ſpecies*, as they that ſuppoſe the *Soul* to be *traduced* from the *Parents*, as well as the *Body*.

§. 55. His laſt Argument is from *Rom.*5.7. *For a good man one would dare to die*, i.e. ſaith he, would *with the preſence of a reſolved Spirit dye*; the word [*daring*] ſaith he, noting a *preſence of minde terrified with no dangers*. To this argument again, as far as by the Authour it can be extended, i. e. to the acknowledgement, or concluding of the *lawfulneſſe of a valiant couragious ſuffering of death*, either for a *publike good*, or for ſome act of eminent *private charity*, I am fully of the *Authors* minde.

§. 56. But the word [*dying*] in that place, ſignifying no more then *ſubmiſſion of the Will*, contentedneſſe, or willingneſſe to ſuffer *death*, not by his own, but by ſome other *hands*, an ἀντιψυχία, a taking thoſe blowes (though never ſo ſharp and mortall) on his *own ſhoulders*, and breaſt, which were meant by the Enemy to another (to the *mercifull*, or *good* man in that Text) there is no Logick can conclude from hence, that a man hath any *power* over his own life, to *take* it away from *himſelf* by any act of *force*, (as αὐθέντης among the Attick Writers, is, ſaith *Phrynicus*, uſed ὅτι τῷ αὐθαίρετος φονέως, *He that kils himſelf, takes upon him an Independent Authority over himſelf*) or to give it into another mans hands, ſo that he may without any farther *Authority* (without any further inveſture of the *power* of the *Sword* from *God*) *lawfully* take it from him. I ſhall conclude this with an obſervation of *Boethius*, that the *love* of *life* is not ſeated in the *will of the Creature*, but in the *principles of Nature*; that ſo our lives may not be ventured on the uncertainties and hazards of our own paſſions, or fatieties, which may incline the will to prefer death ſometimes, but in the *inſtincts* of that more conſtant immutable Rule, which alwayes preſcribes the preſerving of thoſe treaſures, by God and Nature entruſted to us.

Nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animæ voluntatibus, verum ex naturæ principiis venit, Nam ſæpe mortem cogentibus cauſis, quam natura formidat, voluntas amplectitur, &c. de conſol. Phil. l. 3. Proſ. 11.

§. 57. Having made this ſhort, and ſudden return to this Authours reaſonings, Doctor *Hammond* will leave the matter moſt willingly, where this Authour hath placed it, at the feet of all

all *ingenuous, and unprejudiced Readers*, and will endeavour (as unpaſſionately as any man) to approve himſelf a *Servant of Reaſon*, and embracer or *friend of Truth, whereſoever he meets with it*; upon which ſcore, he is content to acknowledge ſome obligations to this *Author*, who hath occaſioned this further ſurvey of his former affirmations, and given all other men ſome cauſe to be more *confirmed* in the perſwaſion and aſſurance of the truth of them. And thus much I conceive is ſufficient to have ſaid upon this occaſion.

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§. 58. BUt it ſeems the *Readers quiet* is not to be obtain'd ſo eaſily; for while that which hath been thus ſaid was under the *Printers* hand, Mr. *John Goodwins* ὑβεισοδίκαι came forth, and by the mention of Doctor *Hammonds* Name twice in his Title-page, gave reaſon to delay this *Vindication* ſo long, till it might appeare whether 'twould be uſeful to adde any thing to it (upon this new occaſion) by way of *Poſt-ſcript*. And herein it hath proved a little unluckily, that this *ſecond Advocate* of the ſame cauſe falling upon this paſſage in the *Addreſſe* (the Subject of our preſent diſcourſe) hath yet in his judgment upon it ſo varied from the former Author, that as he hath yielded the queſtion hitherto debated, and confeſt that *no man hath by nature the power over his own life*; ſo he hath provided a new task for me, by denying the Doctors *conſequence* from hence, [*That then this power cannot be derived to Kings by Men, or from the People.*] This I confeſſe is ſomewhat ſtrange, that that ſhould be imagined *derivable by men, or from the people*, which at the ſame time 'tis confeſt *no man hath*. I have lately learn'd a * *Scotch Proverb* from Maſter *Henderſon*, and find by ſearch the meaning of it to be this plain *Engliſh*, That nothing is derivable from any place, which was never there: and Mr. *Goodwin* acknowledges *the ſtrength of that Conſequence to ſtand in the authority of this Maxime*, Nihil dat quod non habet, *Nothing gives that to another which it hath not it ſelf*. And truly, I ſhall never deſire a firmer *baſis* for any Concluſion of mine, then ſuch an acknowledged *Principle* as this. Should

pag. 22.

* That cannot be brought Bur, that is not the Ben.

I

I finde any part of my poſſeſſions in M. *Goodwins* hands, and he juſtifie his Title to it, by pretending the *donation* or *ſale* from *Philademius* to him, & I produce evidence that this was never in the poſſeſſion of *Philademius*, would there be any more required of me, to conclude conſequently, that 'twas not *derivable* from *Philodemius* to him? would it not be a ſtrange reply, to ſay, That *this conſequence depended on the Authority of a Topick Maxime?* The word [*Topicke*] I ſuppoſe to be here prefixt by him upon a deſigne of *diminution*, as *Topicall* is equivalent with *probable*, and oppos'd to *demonſtrative*. But I hope this is not thus a *Topick Maxime*. Can any *demonſtration* be more convincing, then that which is built upon a *Principle*, as acknowledg'd as any in the *Mathematicks*, and the contrary of which implies a *contradiction* [*to have*, and *not to have?*]

§. 59. As for the reaſon of denying this conſequence, which Maſter *Goodwin* renders, becauſe [*though no particular man hath by nature this power over his own Life, yet as a member of community he hath, not ſimply a power, but a neceſſity lying upon him by way of duty, &c. to conſent with others, that his life ſhall be take from him*] 1. 'Tis not to be imaginable, that he ſhould have a *neceſſity of duty* lying upon him, who hath not *ſimply a power*, meaning, as here he muſt, a *power* of doing it *lawfully*. And 2. For this *power*, or *neceſſity of conſenting* onely (as that differs from *the power of giving*) this will be of no kinde of force, unleſſe it alſo appear that the *Magiſtrate* derives the *power of life* (which is ſuppos'd to be in him) from this *conſent* of theirs, or that it is this conſent of theirs & nothing els which gives him that *power*. But this is ſo far from being *proved*, that it is not ſo much as *affirm'd* by Mr. *Goodwin*: And on the other ſide 'tis cleare, that the bare *conſenting* that a thing ſhall be taken out of my hands, is very diſtant from the taking upon me to *give it*; the latter pretends and ſuppoſeth a *poſſeſſion* or *inveſtiture* in the *giver*, the former doth not in the *Conſenter*; and ſo, though the latter would be of ſome uſe (if granted) to inferre Mr. *Goodwins* concluſion, that the *power is originally from the people*; yet the former will be no way able to inferre it.

§. 60. The matter will be very viſible by *example* in any *Truſt*, or *Stewardſhip*. The *Lord* intruſts to his *Steward* the keeping of a

ſumme of money, after that he aſſigns it over to ſome other man by *Bill of Attorney*, and legally veſts his right in that other. In this caſe the *Steward* formerly intruſted *conſents*, that that other ſhall take what is thus by the *Lord* aſſigned to him, and indeed a neceſſity lies upon him *by way of duty* ſo to do. In this caſe I ſhall ask M. *G. from whom* this money is *deriv'd* to this other? from the *Lord*, or from the *Steward?* I hope he will acknowledge from the *Lord:* The ſame again, when the *King* delivers a Caſtle by way of Truſt to be kept by one of his *Subjects*, and after aſſignes it over to his *Sonne*, and the *Subject* that kept it *conſents* that the *Sonne* ſhould have it, and ſo the *Sonne* enters upon the *poſſeſſion*; the caſe is cleare, that 'tis not from the *Subject* that the *Sonne* derives this *poſſeſſion*, (though 'tis as true that the *Subject conſents* to deliver it up) but from the *King* only: and that act of the Subject is no expreſſion of any *right in him, from him conveyable to the Sonne*, but onely of his *Truſt, and ſubordination to the King*. And this is generally the difference betwixt *Inveſtitures* and *Truſts:* what is *veſted* in me, I may *give* or *derive* to another; what is *intruſted* onely, I cannot: the Servant cannot diſpoſe of his *Maſters goods*; yet that his *Maſters diſpoſal* may ſtand good, he may and ought to give his *conſent*. This is ſo groſſely true, that 'tis pitty any longer to inſiſt on it; and yet 'tis the very thing that the whole point in hand depends on, and was therefore, I conceive, ſo induſtriouſly involv'd, and obſcured by Mr. *Goodwin*.

§. 61. After this, Maſter *Goodwin* inſenſibly glides into another piece of artifice; *The power of life*, ſaith he, *is eminently and virtually in the people collectively taken, though not formally*. And again, *A man, and a body of men, have power over their own lives Radically and Virtually, though not formally*. This period of Maſter *Goodwin* ſeems to be a new way of *Anſwer*, by applying diſtinction to the *Antecedent*, as the former was by denying the *Conſequence*. The *Antecedent* was [*That no man hath by nature the power over his own life, &c.*] from whence the *Addreſſe* concludes, that therefore [*This power cannot be deriv'd from the people*] To this Maſter *Goodwin* firſt returns his acknowledgment, *That if the conſequence be right, it is a clear caſe, that Regal power is not originally in the people, but conferr'd on the Ruler immediately from God,*

God. This is an acknowledgment in him of the truth of the *Antecedent*, and a doubt only of the *Conſequence*, which accordingly he immediately proceeds to invalidate: And therefore 'tis a little ſtrange (and an argument that his firſt attempt was not very *ſucceſsful* to him) that he ſhould now ſo ſoon return to deny the *Antecedent*, at leaſt to *diſtinguiſh* of it, having before ſo *abſolutely granted it*. But to paſſe over this, and allow him this liberty of recalling his bounty, let us examine the force of his *diſtinction*.

§. 62. The force of this *diſtinction* doth not, I conceive, reſpect the *Subject* [*the People*] (as if that might be taken in two notions, either *ſingly*, or *collectively*) becauſe preſently, without that *diſtinction*, he ſpeaks indifferently of [*A man*] and [*A body of men*] but it belongs to the *Copula*, or word [*Is*] and then it muſt be thus diſſolv'd. *The power of life* may be ſaid to be in a man two wayes, 1. *Formally*, 2. *Eminently* and *Virtually*, and *Radically*. This diſtinction of *Formaliter*, and *Eminenter*, hath been apply'd by *Philoſophers* to the *Sun*, and *Heavenly Bodies*: of which it being by them reſolv'd, that they are *ſimple* and free from thoſe mixtures to which our *ſublunary* bodies are ſubject, and yet it being apparent that they warm & heat other things, it is thereupon defined, that they have not heat, or other qualities in them *Formally*, (i.e. in that manner, or kind, that *fire* is *hot*, or we are *hot*) but *Virtually* and *Eminently*, i.e. that they have ſome other virtue or faculty in them, *higher*, or more *eminent* then that heat which is in *inferiour* bodies; and that that doth enable them to warm other things, though they are themſelves ſuch *pure* creatures, as not to have thoſe groſſe qualities in them. Whether this be rightly affirm'd, or onely *nicely conjectured* by *Philoſophers* (for I ſuppoſe there is little known of thoſe diſtant bodies beyond *conjecture*) I ſhall not now enquire, but only deſire to be taught by Mr. *Goodwin* how this can be made appliable to the matter in hand, *i. e.* to *the power of life and death*. This *power*, we know, is in *God* firſt, and if in any *eminently*, and *radically*, and *virtually*, certainly in *him*: And in the *Supreme* Magiſtrate *formally*, being actually inherent in him, though not *originally*, nor in ſo *eminent* a degree as in *God* it is. But can it thus be ſaid alſo to be *eminently*, &c. in the *people*, *i.e.* that the *people*

have in them ſome *higher* and more *eminent virtue* or faculty, then the *power* of every man over his own life; and that that ſupplies the place of that *formal* power, and that by it the *People* beget or produce the *power of life* in the *Supreme Magiſtrate*, as truly, as, if they had it *formally*, they could do? This is the meaning of the diſtinction in the ordinary, and onely notion of it, and muſt be it, if it be rightly appliable: but Mr. *Goodwin* interprets his meaning of it ſo far from this, ſo far from importing or concluding the *People* to have ſuch an *higher* power or faculty (to which [*Eminently*] and [*Virtually*] in oppoſition to [*Formally*] belongs) that 'tis indeed by him ſet down as much *inferiour* to that power *formally* inherent. For thus he interprets it: *A Man, and a body of Men, have power over their own lives Radically, and Virtually; in reſpect whereof, they may render themſelves to a Magiſtrate, and to Lawes, which if they violate, they muſt be in hazard of their lives, &c.* By this I diſcern two things: 1. That by this *Eminent, Virtual, Radical power*, Mr. *Goodwin* underſtands that (which is far enough from the meaning of thoſe words, and) which Logicians call a *remote*, or *indirect power*, (as that is oppos'd to an *immediate*, or *direct*) or rather a *power*, to which this effect is meerly *accidental*; as if the *Patient* were ſaid to have power to cure himſelf, meaning thereby that he hath power to *ſubmit* himſelf to the *Phyſitian*, who is able to cure him. And for Mr. *Goodwin* to aſſume the liberty of ſpeaking thus largely, was not, I ſuppoſe, his want of knowledge in propriety, but his willingneſſe to receive advantage from this abuſe of words. And then 2. If this be the onely meaning of the foure hard words, (*Eminently, Virtually, Radically*, and *Formally*) *viz.* that 'tis *in the power of men* (or the *people* in community of nature) *to render themſelves to a Magiſtrate, and to Lawes; to which rendring 'twill be conſequent, that they ſhall hazard their lives upon violating thoſe Lawes*; then, I ſay, are Mr. *Goodwin* and Doctor *Hammond* very well agreed; for this his explication of that diſtinction is very reconcileable with thoſe words of the *Addreſſe*. *This giving up their* (*i.e.* the peoples) *Liberties to one, or more, makes that man or men a Ruler over them, and being a Ruler, to him belongs* (*deriv'd from God, not from them*) *the power of Life, which Gods decree hath inſtated in the Supreme power, or Ruler, who is therefore in*

that

that relation of avenger for wrath or puniſhment, a Miniſter of God, Rom. 13. *&c.* For whence is it that their rendring themſelves to a *Magiſtrate*, in Mr. *Goodwins* ſtile, brings upon them that *hazard of lives*, in caſe of violation of *Laws*, unleſſe it be that he that hath power of their lives, places that *power* in that *Magiſtrate* to whom they have rendred, or ſubjected themſelves? That this is *God*, and not the *People*, I will not conclude to be Mr. *Goodwins* opinion, becauſe 'tis his main deſign to prove the contrary; but that thoſe words of his, and his diſtinction ſo explained wil bear that ſenſe, I mean, that they will be true, and acknowledg'd by him, that acknowledges the *power of Life* to be onely in the *Supream Governour*, deriv'd from God, I conceive ſufficiently manifeſt; and conſequently, that though this power be ſaid to be in the *People remotely, improperly*, and *indirectly*, and ſo in Mr. *Goodwins* notion of *eminently, &c.* yet 'tis not from the *People*, but from *God* onely, that the Governour hath it.

§. 63. The reply will be as ready, and eaſie alſo to all force, or concludency of the next Argument, that which is taken from the Peoples power, to make, or *conſent to the making* of *Capital Laws*. For 1. Mr. *Goodwin* cannot be ignorant that it hath been ſometimes in the *power of Kings* to make Lawes, without the addition of any *conſent of the people*: ſuch were the *Principum placita* among the *Romans*: and after it was thought fit by Princes to lay ſome reſtraint on themſelves, both that they might be better adviſed, and more readily obeyed; then, though the *peoples conſent* hath been deem'd neceſſary, yet doth this belong onely to the *regulating* and *modifying* the *exerciſe* of this power: the *Fundamentall power* it ſelf *of life*, being in the *Supream Governour*, before the *making* theſe *Lawes*. Now 'tis very eaſie to diſtinguiſh betwixt theſe two, the *power*, and the *Regulating* of the *exerciſe* of that *power*; the *power* in the groſſe, and the *determination of that power* to this, or that particular action. The *interpoſition* of man in the latter of theſe, doth no way prejudge the ſole priviledge of *God* in the donation of the former of them: As the *Grace* of *God* is his peculiar, and proper gift; and yet man may give *Directions*, and *Rules*, how we are to act by that *Principle*, what uſe it will beſt become us to make of that precious *talent* entruſted to us. And therefore, for the great *Noon-day-Truth*,

which Mr.*Goodwin* induceth from theſe,and the like conſiderations, *viz.* [*That men by nature have ſuch a power over their lives, as voluntarily, &c. to expoſe them to the ſtroke of publique juſtice, in caſe they ſhall offend, &c.*] This being granted,is of no force againſt Doctor *Hammond*, but doth with him rather ſuppoſe a *Publique Juſtice* able to ſtrike, *i.e.* a *power of life* already veſted in the *Magiſtrate*,before this *conſent* of the People,or abſtractedly,without reſpect unto it. And ſo ſtil it is not from this *conſent* of *the People*, that this *power* is deriv'd to the *hand of Publick Juſtice*,but from ſome other higher principle *viz.* that of *God*, to whom ἐκδίκησις the *avenging*, or *puniſhing of offenders*, peculiarly belongs, and no other, but in ſubordination to,and ſubſtitution from him.

§. 64. And what if the *King*, as M.*Goodwin* next alleadgeth, *have no power to take away the life of his ſubjects without cauſe, or for every cauſe ,but onely ſuch as by Law are puniſhable with death? what if the cannot command them to be their own Executioners?* Doth it follow from hence, that therefore, he hath the *power of life* from the *People*, not from *God?* Doth the *power of God* ſo conſiſt in doing *cauſeleſſe*, or *irrationall* things, that nothing which is exercis'd *moderately*, or *ordinately*, can be imagin'd to come from him? I ſhall ſuppoſe that *God himſelfe* hath perfect *dominion* over the world; and yet that he obſerves rules of *all-juſtice*,and *goodneſs* in the *exerciſe*, and *diſpenſing* of that *power*,and hath not *power* of doing any thing contrary to thoſe rules of *eternal juſtice*,which he hath preſcribed to himſelf;which to do,by all wiſe men hath been counted an act of *imbecility*,not of *power*. And conſequently,how naturall is it that he ſhould thus *determine* and *limit* his deputies alſo?give them *power of life* over their *Subjects*,and yet command them to *exerciſe that power* with that juſt temperament, which either *natural*, or *civill*, or *municipall Lawes* ſhall dictate, and preſcribe them? And therefore Maſter *Goodwins* arguing is very looſe,and unconcluding? [*That if the power which the King hath over the lives of the people, were immediately from God, then he might lawfully execute the ſame,and take away the lives of men, without any mediating direction, or warranty from any Law.*] For ſure the ſame God that gives the *Magiſtrate* the *power of life*,doth command him alſo not to throw away that pre-

pretious truſt cauſeleſly, makes him his *Miniſter for wrath to them that do evil*, and contrariwiſe a *rewarder* to them that do *well*; and though he *ſubject* him not to any earthly *ſuperior*, but reſerve him to his own ſevere *tribunal*, yet he *ſubjects* him to *reaſon*, and *rules of Juſtice*, and (when he hath undertaken to govern by that Standard) to the *poſitive municipal Lawes* of that particular Kingdom alſo, and hath been as particular in preſcribing *Lawes* to the *Prince*, to avoid *Oppreſſion* or *acts* of *Height*, as to *Subjects* to abſtain from *reſiſtance*.

§. 65. As for that proof which Mr. *Goodwin* produceth to enforce his arguing, *viz.* [*That the execution of no commiſſion immediately iſſued by God, ought to be ſuſpended upon, or determin'd, or regulated by any commiſſion or conſtitution of men*] It is as far from truth, as it could well have been contriv'd to be: as will appear, if it be conſidered, that the word [*Commiſſion*] 1. ſignifies not an *abſolute* or *poſitive Command*, but onely a *power*, or *inveſtiture* of *Authority*; or if a *Command*, yet that 2. onely an *Affirmative precept*, the nature of which is, that it binds not *ad ſemper*, and ſo conſequently may be *ſuſpended* at ſome time, by the *free will* of him that hath the *Commiſſion*, much more if any weighty *reaſon* interpoſe to *determine* his *will*. 3. That this *Commiſſion* is onely *general* and *indefinite*, without application to particular caſes, referring that *application* to the *conjuncture* and *concurrence* of circumſtances, (which ordinarily are humane and political) and conſequently to the *diſcretion* of *Rulers* judging by thoſe *circumſtances*: Th: intervenience of which circumſtances makes the particular *exerciſe* of that *Commiſſion* convenient, and ſeaſonable in one *place*, and at one *time*; and conſequently, where they do not intervene, there the exerciſe of it may be at that *time* and *place* ſuſpended as unſeaſonable. As when the *ſhedder of blood* is by *God* commanded to be put to death, and yet ſome men accidentally and involuntarily fall under that Title; it muſt be in the *power* of the *Magiſtrate* to *ſuſpend the execution* of that ſentence, or elſe the *Innocent* muſt loſe the benefit of the *City of refuge*, and run the ſame fortune with the moſt *murtherous deſigner*.

§. 66. After this manner 'tis clear, that *Chriſt* had a *commiſſion* from heaven to work *Miracles*, to cure *Diſeaſes*; yet 'tis particularly affirm'd of the *infidelity* of his Country-men, that that

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ſuſpended the exerciſe of his power for ſome time; *He could not doe many mighty works there becauſe of their unbelief*; yet, I hope, this wil no way be thought to argue, that *Chriſts commiſſion* iſſued from his *Country-men*, or from the *beliefe of men*, (though that were neceſſary, to the exerciſe of it) or that *Chriſt* did ill in *ſuſpending the exerciſe of his Commiſſion*. In like manner the people of *Iſrael* had from *God* not onely a *commiſſion*, but *command* to put the *nations* to death, *Deut.* 20. 10. And yet on thoſe of them that were left, 1 *Kings* 9. 20. *Solomon ſuſpended the act of that commiſſion*, and onely *levied a tribute of bond-ſervice*, verſ. 21. Once more; I ſhall ſuppoſe a *General* to receive power of *Martiall Law* from the Soveraigne in any Kingdome; this power he is not willing to exerciſe, but by a cognizance of each malefactors cauſe before a *Councel of Warre*: Here 'tis plain that that *Councel of Warre ſuſpends that exerciſe* of the *Generals power* upon a particular man; but ſure it will no way follow from thence, that that *Commiſſion*, which was ſuppos'd to iſſue to the *General* from the *Soveraign*, doth now iſſue not from the *Soveraign*, but that *Councel of War*; and then no more will the poſſibility of ſuſpending the *exerciſe* of the *Kings Commiſſion* by Law, &c. conclude that *Commiſſion* to iſſue from the *People*, and not from *God*. And therefore in the caſe which Mr. *Goodwin* hath been confident to referre to Doctor *Hammond* to Arbitrate, [*Whether the King hath any Regular or juſt power over the lives of men, other then that which is proportion'd, &c. by the Laws of the State*] I ſuppoſe the Doctor may agree with Mr. *Goodwin*, and yet never be enforc'd, or concluded by that conceſſion, to queſtion the *Original* of the *power from God*, the difference being diſcernible between the *Power it ſelf*, and every particular *exerciſe of that power*; and the *ſuſpenſion* of the *latter*, farre from including the *evacuation*, or *cancelling of the former*.

§. 67. The ſame anſwer will clear Mr. *Goodwins* ſucceeding Plea, *pag.* 26. That if *the power of Kings over the lives of men, were by immediate derivation from God, then muſt this power be uniforme, &c. in all Kingdomes whatſoever.*] This *conſequence* is far from all appearance of truth; Becauſe the power may be from *God*, and yet that *God* that *gives* the power, may leave it in the particular *exerciſes* of it, to be *determined* either by the arbitration,

tion, and free will, and prudence of the *Governour*, where there are no *Lawes*, or by the *Regulation of Lawes*, where there are ſuch; The *Dimenſum*, or *proportion of power over the lives of the Subjects*, which a *Governour* claims, conſiſts not in *indiviſibili*, in any certain, or definite point, but is that which may enable him to diſcharge his office of *Ruler*, *i. e.* to *protect* his people, and reſtrain their inordinacies. And as farre as *Reaſon*, and (which are ſuppoſed to be a branch of that) *particular Lawes*, (ſubordinate to Gods Word) ſee it fit to extend the *exerciſe of that power*, ſo far may that *Ruler* regularly extend it; And whatſoever *proportion* it be, that he is intruſted with by *God*, 'tis not reaſonable that he ſhould irrationally extend the *exerciſe* of it. And this *regulation* of *indefinite* power by ſuch prudent limits as theſe (*i. e.* by the *Univerſall* law of *Reaſon* and *Juſtice*, or by the particular concluſions, which the wiſdome of *Law-givers* hath thought fit to deduce from thence) cannot juſtly be quarrell'd, as a *retrenchment of power*, any more, then the infinite goodneſſe of God which permits him not to be able to doe any thing which is contrary to that attribute, is a *manicling*, or reſtraining his *Omnipotence*; but is onely a cultivating and dreſſing of it, a *paring off the exceſſes*, and exorbitances of it, and leaving it a *form'd* channell, inſtead of a vaſt or *unbridled Ocean*.

§. 68. And thus I ſuppoſe the nature of *Angels* or men, which have bounds of *Virtue* and *Conſcience*, and *Lawes* preſcribed them, within which they are to move, and not to range unlimited in the deſert of their own uncertain propoſals, cannot thereby be ſaid to have loſt the *liberty* of their *ſpecies*, or to have received *no powers* from *God* in their *creation*, though ſome *regulations* (it muſt be acknowledged) they are under, and conſequently, *determinations* and *ſuſpenſions for the exerciſe of their powers*. And what inconvenience the affirming of this will bring upon the *Doctor*, what *hazard of blaſpheming of God*, *&c.* I muſt profeſſe my ſelf ſo tame, as not to fore-ſee, or imagine, howſoever Maſter *Goodwins* ἀμετρία ἀνδολικῆς hath helpt him to phanſie ſuch inviſible *Mormos*, and *Anakims* in our paſſage.

§. 69. Next, it is but *affirm'd*, and not at all made probable by Maſter *Goodwin*, that the *Affirming the Kings power over the lives of the people to bee by immediate derivation from God, is to*

 ſmite

ſmite them with blindneſſe,&c. and *not to diſcover to them the Dan and Berſheba* (I ſuppoſe he meanes by this *trope*, the *due bounds and limits*) *of ſuch their power*] I am ſorry M. *Goodwin* ſhould think it fit that ſuch *popular harangues* ſhould be admitted to ſupply the place of *reaſon*, and ſhall briefly reply, That they that affirme the *power* of the *Sword* to be from *God* derived to *Magiſtrates*, doe at the ſame time define, and affirm, that thoſe *Magiſtrates* are to remain *rationall creatures*, and to continue under the *Soveraigntie* of *Reaſon*, and all the branches of that, as farre as their particulars are concerned in it, i.e. to be ruled by the *Univerſall Lawes* of *Juſtice* and *Equity*, by the Civill Sanctions which tend to the preſerving of Societies, and conſequently by the *particular Locall*, or *municipall Lawes* of any Country, which are ſuppoſed to have a peculiar *propriety* toward the preſerving, and regulating of that *People*.

§. 70. 'Twill now be to little purpoſe to prove that theſe two affirmations are reconcileable, the one deriving the *power of life* to the *Ruler* from God, the other acknowledging the *regulation* of this power by theſe bounds; For there is no kind of repugnance, or contradiction, nothing but accord and amity between them: The very *Hand of God* that conferres this power, gives this very *direction* and *Law* for the *exerciſe* of it, that they that rule other men ſhould themſelves be guided by *Reaſon* in all their actions: And what that *reaſon* is in each particular emergent, they are not alwayes, or onely, th: *Judicials of Moſes*, which are fit to direct us, but the wiſdome ſometimes of *Particular Laws*, and *Law-makers*. And ſo there is ſmall danger either of *enſnaring Kings*, or *diſturbing States* (as he ſeems willing to fear) *by this Doctrine*; which though it define the Originall of this power to be from *Heaven*, can yet allow the *regulation of this power* for the *Exerciſe* of it to be of an *inferiour, Humane, Political Origination.*'

§. 71. One Argument more Mr. *Goodwin* is pleaſed to take in to diſprove the *immediate derivation of this power of life from God*. Becauſe, ſaith he, that *derivation which is immediate from God, can by no wayes be aſſiſted, furthered, or promoted by any creature, or ſecond meanes: but this derivation of that power of life is at leaſt furthered by the act of the people in electing, &c.* Ergo. I ſhall not

not examine the force of his enſuing probations, which have frailties enough in them, but ſhall be content to ſuppoſe the moſt he can wiſh, or imagine, *viz.* That the people doe *elect* or *chooſe* their *King*; In this caſe, ſaith the Doctor, *The people give not the power of their lives to that King, but by giving up their Liberties, &c. to him, nominate him to that office of ſupream power, which, whereſoever it is, God ſuperinveſts with the power of life.* This is the *Doctors* ſtating of the queſtion in his *Addreſſe*, and thereby the ſeparation is evident between the *Act* of the *People* in *Electing the perſon* of the *Ruler*, and the *Act* of *God* in conferring this *power of life*. All that can be ſaid of the former of theſe is, that that *Act* of the people is the means of *determining* the *Generall decree of God* (that *Rulers* ſhall (as his *Deputies*) have the *power of life*) to this *particular* perſon, not that it is an *aſſiſtent*, or ſocial cauſe in conveying this power to the Ruler, much leſſe that it ſhall undertake to wreſt this *power* out of *Gods* hands, and aſſume it into their *owne*; but, I ſay, as a *cauſa ſine quâ non*, or a previous *preparation* of the ſubject, by their choiſe qualifying the perſon to be thus *inveſted*, and impower'd by God. And ſo, though the people in this caſe are ſuppoſed to do ſomwhat, *i.e.* to *Elect*, and that *election* to determine this power of *Gods* to this perſon, yet is this power derived ſolely from *God*, as the *Addreſſe* hath ſufficiently explain'd, and not from any *Act* of the *People*: And therefore the word [*Furthering*] in M. *Goodwins* argument, may be taken (as an equivocal word) in a double ſenſe, either to denote *actuall aſſiſtance*, or contribution of force, or efficacy, toward the production of the effect, *viz.* of the *power of life* in the *Ruler*: And in that ſence it is not true, that the *Act of the People in Electing, doth further this power*, it being the ſole Act of *Gods decree* to give that power, and nothing elſe. Or elſe the word [*Furthering*] may be taken to ſignifie no more then *preparing* or *qualifying* the Subject to a capacitie of receiving this *power* from *God*, (as *John Baptiſt* prepared mens hearts for the *receiving* of *Chriſt*, when he came, but had nothing to doe in the *miſſion* of him, which was the ſole work of God) and thus indeed, the *Election of the people* may further the derivation of this *power* from *God*, to ſuch a particular ruler; and there is nothing more ordinary then for *Gods* works to be thus *furthered* by ſecond cauſes or means, even

his work of *Grace*, which he owns moſt peculiarly. The reſemblance made uſe of in the Addreſſe, is very commodious to clear this whole matter. In the *Generation* of a childe, the Parents are acknowledged to contribute much, to be not onely *furtherers*, but even *efficients* in the production, Yet is it commonly agreed, that *God* creates, infuſes, and inſpires the Soul immediately. I need not examine, or atteſt the truth of the ordinary opinion, that the ſoul comes from *Heaven*, not from the *Parents*; becauſe I now uſe it as a reſemblance onely, and that it may be allowed to be, though it ſhould not be true; and thus far at leaſt it will be *argmentative*, that the *electing* of the perſon of the *Ruler* by the *people*, doth no more conclude that the *power* of *life* is not ſuperinfuſed and derived to the *Ruler* (ſo choſen) from Heaven, then the Parents begetting of the childe is an argument, that the *Soul* is not ſuperinfuſed from *God*. Our *Phænomena* may be all very happily ſolved by this way of ſetting it; and M. *G.* exceptions ſuperſeded, and the concluſion cleared, which was the onely one, which the *Addreſſe* deſired to infer by this conſideration, *viz.* That *whatſoever were ſuppoſed of the peoples electing their Ruler, yet the Supream power neither is nor can be in the community of the people by force meerly of their Originall, or naturall Liberty*, upon this firm ground (not yet ſhaken by M. *G.* or *Philodemius*) that the *power of life*, which is part of the *Supream Power*, is not part of the *naturall Libertie*, nor conſequently either inherent in the *Community of men*, nor by them communicable to any *Repreſentative*. ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι, The onely thing, which this Rejoynder (as the former diſcourſe) was deſigned to demonſtrate moſt irrefragably.

§. 72. And having proceeded thus farre to make return to M. *Goodwins* offers of *reaſon*, I ſhall not endeavour to make payment to his *Scoffes*, pag. 28. or vindicate Doctor *Hammond* from his charge of *overweeningneſs*, &c. Though 'tis not at all intelligible to me, how thoſe words in the *Addreſſe* [*For it is poſſible that I may put you in mind of an evident Truth, which perhaps you have not taken notice of*] ſhould be chargeable with this οἰησιοφία, or interpretable to any further ſenſe, then onely this, That this truth ſo evident in Doctor *Hammonds* opinion, was not by him conceived to be ſufficiently taken notice of, or laid to heart by them, to whom he then made his *Addreſſe*. And if that Doctor were

were therein miſtaken, or if he be juſtly charged in his next page (together with the reſt of his perſwaſion under the title *of the whole Legion of the Royall Faction*) *as the firſt-born of that evill Generation of Flatterers*, for producing plain Arguments of Reaſon and Scripture, to avert that which appear'd to him a heavy Sinne, and Judgement, from a Nation; I muſt then betake my ſelfe to my *Prayers*, that *God* will forgive me my more diſcernible ſinnes, (when innocencies and good offices to mankind are become ſo culpable) and get out of his company as ſoon as I can, who can ſo readily ſhift the diſcourſe from *reaſoning* to *defaming*, and ſupply with *reproaches* what was wanting in *Arguments*.

§. 73. I am now come to an end of this debate concerning the Power of life, but cannot be ſo prudent, or thrifty of my pains, as to diſſemble the other exceptions, which (in this book) M. *Goodwin* hath made to ſome other parts of the *Addreſſe*; I ſhall give you as brief an account of them as is poſſible.

§. 74. The firſt, is his diſlike of that *Critick annotation*, as he ſtiles it, *of the Royall Doctor, taking notice* [*that the Supream Power, or Ruler is ſtiled by the Apoſtle*, Rom. 13. *the Miniſter of God, and not of the people.*] How this comes to be ſtiled a *Critick annotation*, (which ſuppoſes it a *Grammaticall* one, (as τεχνικὴ, ἐξηγητικὴ, κριτικὴ, are the parts *diviſive* of γραμματικὴ) where there is no uſe made of *Grammar* to deduce it, nor indeed of any thing but of the plain words, as they lie in the Text) I have not the skill, or ſagacity to divine. All that Doctor *Hammond* affirmes is this, that the *Supream power*, Rom. 13. *is ſtiled by the Apoſtle, the Miniſter of God, and not of the people.* And is not this manifeſt to any that looks on *Rom.* 13. 4. where he is twice ſtiled διάκονος θεοῦ, *the Miniſter of God*, and is neither there, nor any where elſe ſtiled the *Miniſter of the People.* Vi. Moſchopul. Gram. Gr.

§. 75. But, ſaith M. *Goodwin*, *This no way infringes the credit of his concluſion, that Kings are the Servants and Miniſters of the People.* The *Apoſtles* were the *Miniſters of God, and yet they preach themſelves alſo the ſervants of Men*, 2 Cor. 4. 5. *and Miniſters of the Saints*, Rom. 15. 25, &c. To this I anſwer, that the phraſe διάκονος θεοῦ, *Miniſter of God*, ſignifies a *Miniſter of Gods Ordination*, and *Inſtitution*, and though it may ſignifie ſomewhat

elſe, yet this is the onely notion wherein Doctor *Hammond* takes it in his *Addreſſe*, according to *Rom.* 13. of which he ſpeaks, where the *powers are ſaid to be ordained by* God, and to be his *Ordinance*. Now he that is thus a *Miniſter of* God, cannot be alſo of the *People*, becauſe theſe two Ordinations being incompatible, he that holds by one, muſt needs diſclaim holding by the other. Another notion there may be of the phraſe, as it ſignifies *performing of ſervice to God*; and ſo indeed the ſame *Apoſtle* that *ſerves* God, may be a *ſervant of Men* alſo; and to that, all M. *Goodwins* probations are directed: and though S. *Pauls* διακονεῖν ἁγίοις, *his carrying of almes, and contributions to the poore Saints*, be no very proper inſtance to this purpoſe; yet thus 'tis acknowledged, that S. *Paul* may be a *ſervant of Men*, and perform Offices of Humility to them, (though by the way this *Servant* of theirs behaves himſelf ſometimes very like a *Maſter*, and comes with a *Rod* when he ſees it convenient.)

§. 76. But this is nothing to the purpoſe to infer the *King* to be διάκονος ἀνθρώπων, a *Miniſter of the People* in the former notion, *i.e.* a *Miniſter of the peoples Inſtitution*; and therefore all that Maſter *Goodwin* addes of the Reaſons why the *Ruler*, *Rom.* 13. is not called the *Miniſter of the people*, is very extrinſecall to that purpoſe. The utmoſt that he can enforce from that place is, that the *King attends on the publique good*. But ſure that will availe as little to prove that he is not a *Miniſter of* Gods *inſtituting*, or one that hath the power from him, as the Shepheards waiting over the Flock, is a proof that he is *ordained*, or *inſtituted* by his Sheep.

§. 77. The next undertaking of M. *Goodwin* againſt Doctor *Hammond*, is to prove that the *Civill Magiſtrate* is by Saint *Peter* call'd ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις; which he renders the *Ordinance* or *creature of Man, becauſe they receive their very being from the people as Kings, and as Magiſtrates*. Doctor *Hammond* hath, I conceive, ſufficiently vindicated that Text of S. *Peter* from this interpretation, and 'twere eaſie to ſhew, that the phraſe ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις muſt by all Analogy be rendred *Humane creature*; not *Ordinance*, or *creature of Man*; by *humane creature*, meaning any part of mankind; by creature of man, a thing of mans creating. The phraſe to expreſſe the latter of theſe would be. κτίσμα ἀνθρώπου, taking

taking *Creature* for *production*, or *work*, and *Man* for the *artificer*, or *workman* of it; what is ſaid in the *Addreſſe*, is ſufficient to direct any ſober man to a right underſtanding of that place. And M. *Goodwins* exceptions are very far from perſwading the contrary. As 1. [*That the King is there called Supream, not in reſpect of the community of the people, as*, ſaith he, *the Doctor ſuppoſeth, but as compar'd with ſubordinate Rulers.*] But this is of no force againſt the *Doctor* in that place, where all that he inferres from their title of *ſupream*, is, that they are the very perſons that are enſtiled the *Ordinance of God*, *Ro.* 13. & that is the *ſignal character* which he mẽtions in that text, without taking notice of any other aſpect of the word *Supream*, or drawing any nice concluſion from it.

§. 78. His ſecond exception is againſt the concludence of a *Negative Argument*. Which I acknowledge an exception ſo far as to keep that Argument from being demonſtrative, in caſe all the force of it were fetcht from the *Negative*; But that Argument from the *Negative* (or from the *governours* not being ſaid to be *ſent by the people*) is but *præluſory* and preparative to another more forcible branch of the *Argument*, *viz.* that (on the contrarie) *Supremacy* is affixt to the King, and *Subjection for the Lords ſake*, commanded to be paid him, (as *miſſion from him* is affirmed of all other *Magiſtrates*) And both thoſe put together, the *Kings being Supream*, (i.e. inferior to none but God) and *Subjection* being affirmed to be due to him *for the Lords ſake*, (i. e. becauſe of the relation which he ſtands in to God, by whom he is ſaid to be ordained, *Rom.* 13.) may well enough paſſe for a *character* of ſome remark upon the King, and keep the pretended rendring of ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, from being the neceſſary importance of that Text, or the *Supream* power from being concluded to be *originally in the people*.

§. 79. As for the [*groaning of the creation or creature*] *Rom.* 8. which Doctor *Hammond* renders [*the hope of the Heathen World*] 'tis not all M. *Goodwins* σκιαμαχία that will render it an improbable interpretation. That the *Heathen world* (though *without hope*, i.e. in a deſperate condition in reſpect of ſalvation, as long as they remained in their idolatries) were yet ſo capable of receiving benefit of *Chriſts* coming into the world, that *Chriſt* is called *Deſiderium omnium Gentium*, the deſire of all Nations, in

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Haggai, and προσδοκία ἐθνων, *the expectation of the Gentiles*, in the Septuagints rendring of *Jacobs* Prophecie; that they seeing their own impure condition, desired the means of *restoring* their lost treasure, and consequently are said to *desire Christ*, without explicit foreknowing any thing of him, (because that which they desired was no otherwise compassable, but by him) is no nicety of the Doctors invention, but largely insisted on by S. *Augustine* in his Bookes *De Civ. Dei*; and this one Consideration is Reply sufficient to all the inconveniences which Mr. *Goodwin* hath sprung in this interpretation.

§. 80. As for the other difficulties which to him seem to presse and resist the interpreting of the following words to this sense, they are not so solemnly mentioned by Mr. *Goodwin* as to own my impertinence, if I should enlarge on them; though I can assure him that Doctor *Hammond* hath long since considered the whole Context, and is ready to give an account of the agreeablenesse of it to his present notion, whensoever it shall be seasonable. Onely in favour to the Reader, he doth not unnecessarily obtrude it on him at this time, meaning to expect a fairer opportunitie for that, and other the like dissertations.

§. 81. But Master *Goodwin* upon the granting of this notion of πᾶσα κτίσις, for the *heathen* world, hath falne upon a speciall χρησθύγετον, that however, *It signifies the world under the consideration of being the Creature or creation of God.* And then he wonders why ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις should not signifie the *Magistrate to be the creation of Man, and how by this interpretation that conclusion of the Kings being the creature of the people, is avoyded.* To this I answer punctually, that M. *Goodwin* being the affirmer of this doctrine, [*That the King is the creature of the people*] and his proof of it being those words of S. *Peter*, where *obedience* is commanded to be paid πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει, as 'tis by him rendred, *to every creation*, or *ordinance*, or *creature* of man, It is certainly sufficient for Doctor *Hammond* (to disprove this conclusion so inferred from that place of S. *Peter*) if he shall be able to mention another probable interpretation of those words, from whence that *Conclusion* will not be inferred; especially if by other places of Scripture he make it manifest, that that interpretation is most agreeable to the analogie of that and other *Scriptures*. Now this

this hath D. *Hammond* done, by ſhewing that πᾶσα ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις is a phraſe which needs not ſignifie any more then *every man, or humane creature*, not onely *Chriſtian*, but *Gentile*, or Heathen alſo. Which if it be the entire notation of the phraſe (as at this time M. *Goodwin* is content to grant) then ſure is there no ground for him from thence to conclude, that the *King* is ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις in that other ſo diſtant ſenſe, *an ordinance or creature of the people*. As long as M. *G.* concluſion depends upon that *one* onely notion of the phraſe, ſo long, unleſſe that be acknowledged the genuine ſenſe of it, (as certainly 'tis not, when another ſo diſtant from that, is ſuppoſed poſſible to be it) there is no ſtability to be expected to that concluſion, whoſe premiſſes are thus forfeited by his own *conceſſion*.

§. 82. As for the *Doctors* Anſwer to the ſuppoſed Objection, (where by the parallel *command of honouring all, ver.* 17. he infers the limitation of the Subject, *All to whom honour belongeth* there, (*i.e.* ſuperiors, not inferiors) and ſo here, *every humane creature*, (*i. e.* every ſuch, that is in place of *Magiſtracie*) certainly M. *G.* hath failed much in his attempt to invalidate it, by affirming that that *Apoſtle*, in his *command to honour all, ſuppoſeth a debt of honour due from every man to every man, according to that of* Rom. 12. 10. *In honour preferring one another*. For to this I anſwer, that the meaning of 1 *Pet.* 2. 17. cannot ſure ſo properly be fetcht from *Rom.* 12. 10. as it may from the circumſtances of the Text and verſes on each ſide of it in the place of S. *Peter*. In the former verſes, 13, and 14. the words clearly refer to the doctrine of *obedience to Superiours*, and ſo *ver.* 15. the mention of *Gods Will* [that *by well-doing we ſhould put to ſilence the ignorance of fooliſh men*] (i.e. that by obeying of our *Superiours* we ſhould take off the Scandal that lay on *Chriſtianity*, as if it made men *ill Subjects, ver.* 16.) doth plenarily belong alſo to the ſame matter. So again, *honouring the King* in the end of the 17. *ver.* and *ſervants obeying their Maſters, ver.* 18. are very forward to concurre with this notion; And the precept of *loving the brotherhood*, i. e. their *fellow-Chriſtians*, and of *fearing God*, (from which *fear* the *honour* divolves upon [his Vicegerent) will no way prejudice this notion of the *honour* there ſpoken of, that it belongs onely to the debt of *inferiours* to *ſuperiours*; and ſo that the [*All*] are onely thoſe *all* that are thus capable of it.

§. 83. As for the *honouring* of *Widowes* (by Maſter *Goodwin* mention'd from Saint *Paul* to *Timothy*) that ſure is not appliable to this matter, ſince the *honour* there, is the *releeving*, or feeding of them, giving them that *honour of ſupply*, which is acknowledged to be another notion of the word, not that which in the fifth *Commandement*, and thoſe other places, is the principall importance of it.

§. 84. As little reaſon hath M. *Goodwin* to conclude that the precept of *being Subject one to another*, 1 *Pet.* 5. 5. ſhould not be a precept of *obedience* to *Superiors*, when the words immediately precedent are, *Likewiſe ye younger ſubmit your ſelves to the Elders*, and thoſe *Elders*, *verſ* 2. the ποιμαίνοντες & ἐπισκοποῦντες, the *Paſtors and Biſhops of the Church*. 'Tis poſſible indeed that the [*one another*] may be, *Others* beſide *Superiors*, but ſure 'tis not ſo probably ſo, when that which immediately precedes, is *Submiſſion* to *Elders*, to which the ſubjection here added, is not a phraſe of *diminution*, but of *addition* rather, and when *Gods reſiſting the proud*, that immediately followes, is, ſaith Saint *Auguſtine*, (as in the Poet, *debellare ſuperbos*) the direct contrary to *Subjects is parcere*, the giving *pardon*, or *grace* to the *obedient Subjects*. And thus I conceive the parallel words of Saint *Paul*, *Eph.* 2. 21. *Submitting your ſelves one to another*] are moſt probably to be interpreted to thoſe among you who are in any relation of *ſuperiority*, for ſo it followes immediately, *ver.* 22. *Wives ſubmit your ſelves to your own Husbands*, &c. Whereas, when he returnes to the *Husbands dutie* toward the *Wife*, it is not *ſubmiſſion* but *love* only, *v.* 25 Other places I might eaſily mention, where the word (ἀλλήλως) may very well ſignifie no more then *others*. So the ἐξομολογεῖσθε ἀλλήλοις τὰ παραπτώματα, *confeſſe your faults one to another*, *Jam.* 5. 16. cannot farther be extended then to a direction to the ſicke to make *confeſſion of his ſinnes*, whether to *others ſimply*, or to thoſe *others* whom he hath *injur'd*, but obligeth not them that are in *health* to *confeſſe their ſins reciprocally* or back again to the ſick; and ſo in the next words [*and pray* ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων, *for one another*] that is, that the brethren in health ſhould *pray for them that are ſick*, and not *reciprocally* that the *ſick* ſhould *pray* for them in *health*, the end of the prayer there mentioned being ἵνα ἰαθῆτε, *that ye may be healed*; which end, and cloſe doth, I conceive, con-

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fine the diſcourſe to the *ſick* firſt to *confeſſe*, and to the *healthie* after to pray for the *ſick*, and no more. And ſo φιλόξενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους, 1 Pet. 4. 9. notes *hoſpitality* to the *ſtrangers* that wanted, and not *mutuall*, *reciprocall entertainments* one of the other: For though it is poſſible that it might note the inhabitants civilitie to the *traveller* firſt, and then that *travellers* repayment of the like, when he comes to be a fixt *Inhabitant*, yet the word ξένοι, *ſtrangers*, being ordinarily taken as a *ſpecies* of men in want (as beſides ſome places of Scripture, I remember in *Juſt. Mart. ſecond Apolog.* ſpeaking of the *offertory*, he ſaith that by that meanes *the Præfect became the guardian of ſtrangers, &c. and of all that were in want*) I conceive φιλόξενοι is no more then *kinde* to that ſort of *poore ſtrangers*, and that without any expectation of being *entertain'd* by *them again*, for that the *Alms-giver* ſhould expect that return from the *poore* or *ſtranger*, is both *unreaſonable* and *unchriſtian* alſo. So *Luke* 12. 1. καταπατεῖν ἀλλήλους cannot be taken reciprocally, that they which *trod* on others were alſo *trod* upon by them, but that *one trod upon another*, agreeable to our preſent ſenſe: So *Act.* 7. 26. ἵνατί ἀδικεῖτε ἀλλήλους; not that the perſon *injur'd* was *injurious* alſo, but onely that *one injur'd the other*. And yet more plainly, *Rom.* 2. 15. *their thoughts excuſing or accuſing*, μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, where it cannot be imagined that the thoughts *mutually* or reciprocally *accuſe* or *excuſe*, the *accuſation* belonging *to the conſcience*, which *accuſeth* the erronious will, but not in like manner to the will, that that ſhould *accuſe* the *Conſcience*. Theſe places are added *ex abundanti*; That of *Epheſ.* 5. will be able alone to ſerve the turne, if theſe others ſhould not be thought to be *demonſtrative*. I have thus briefly reply'd to theſe other exceptions of M. *Goodwin* as farre as concernes that Place in Saint *Peter*, and I ſuppoſe have vindicated it from being the foundation of M. *Goodwins* beloved *dogma* (which I ſhall deſire him to ſhew to be the affirmation of any one ancient Father or Commentator on that place, or of any one place of Scripture beſides, which might help to countenance it) that *Kings are the creatures of the people*.

§. 85. There are yet ſome old reckonings which M. *Goodwin* is willing to make even with the *Doctor*, and I muſt beg a very little patience from the *Reader* to obſerve what *account* he hath given of them.

§. 86. He begins with fair words of Doctor *Hammond*, and acknowledgements, that *having frequently heard of him, he never heard any thing but well and worthy of a man, his judgement in the grand State-queſtion of the times onely excepted.* That the diſcharge of his *Conſcience* in obedience to the fifth *Commandement* ſhould be thus made an exception againſt the *Doctor*, he hath ſure learnt μὴ ξενίζεσθαι neither to thinke *ſtrange*, nor take ill at M. *G.* hands, remembring that ſome of the *Chriſtians* which were antiently in the world, in the abſence of other viſible crimes, were thought worthy of all reproaches for their *common* profeſſion, or being *Chriſtians*. One thing onely I ſhall ſuppoſe, I have the *Doctors* leave to aſſure M. *G.* that it was no ſpecial *deſire to engage* M. *G.* which cauſed the particular mentions, and refutations of ſome paſſages in his bookes, but onely the opinion which he had, that they might probably prove matter of *ſeduction* to the Reader (and that ſeduction of a dangerous conſequence) if ſuch neceſſarie antidotes were not provided to *avert*, or *prevent* the *danger*. D. *Hammond*, I ſuppoſe, is not over-fond of ſuch diſputes, or debates as theſe, and is never more in conſtraint, then when he lies under ſuch engagements.

§. 87. Some paſſages in M. *G. Butchers bleſſing* were a firſt great temptation to him, which though reſiſted by the love of quiet, prepared him to receive more violent impreſſions from ſome remarkable Sections in the *Anticavalieriſme*, And at laſt the fire kindled, and his pen gave teſtimonie of it.

§. 88. The particulars he then took notice of in M. *G.* were 1. His dexterities in evacuating the force of *Tertullians* teſtimonies concerning the *patience*, and non-reſiſtance of the *Primitive Chriſtians*, and theſe are at large refuted in the tract of *Reſiſting*, &c. page 10. to page 20. Secondly, his ſtrange affirmation of *Gods hiding from the firſt Chriſtians this libertie of reſiſting Superiours, as part of his counſell to bring Antichriſt into the world, and his manifeſting it to us now, as a meanes of caſting Antichriſt out.* The latter of theſe two, D. *H.* conceived as ſtrange, and as dangerous a Doctrine, as he ever met with, and therefore examined it to the *bottome*. *Reſiſt.* page 21. to 28. Theſe two main matters of difference D. *Hammond* acknowledges to have managed againſt M. *G.* but I conceive without any thing of *aſperitie*, or *exceſſe* in any

any kind, which ſhould look like a *particular deſire of engaging* M.*G.* And M. *G.* hath thought fit for many yeares to let theſe reckonings ſleep without ever giving the leaſt reply to either of them. And now that [*of Gods hiding of truths from the Ancient Chriſtians*, and the *helping Antichriſt to his throne*] hath not the fortune to be taken notice of at all. And for the other of *Tertullian*, though that be now mentioned, yet is it a little ſtrange that no other return would be made to all the *Doctors anſwers*, ſave onely the tranſcribing of two or three pages from M. *Rutterford*, and M. *Pryn*, as from a paire of *Royaliſts*, in their two tracts of *Lex Rex*, and *Soveraigne power of Parliaments*, which ſure he could not believe will be of any Authority with the *Doctor*, though he is ſo pleaſant as to mention the *friendlineſſe of their judgements, and the Doctors in caſe of the late King:* Beſides this *tranſcription*, there is but one paſſage in thoſe diſſertations of the *Doctors*, to which he thinkes fit to make reply; and that is a *Grammaticall* σφάλμα, taken notice of παρέργως by the *Doctor*, *viz.* M. *Goodwins* attributing to *Montaniſt*, that he call'd himſelf the *holy Ghoſt*. This D.*Hammond* did conceive to be haſtily written by M. *Goodwin*, and not agreeably to the rules of the *Grammer*, unleſſe as in *Smectymnus*, *Areopagi* are ſet for the *Areopagites*, ſo *è contra*, *Montaniſt* were ſet by M. *G.* for *Montanus*. In this caſual incidental charge M. *G.* thinkes himſelf very neerly concern'd, more it ſeems, then in giving account either of his *Cenſure of Tertullians teſtimony* of the *Chriſtians patience*, or of *Gods hiding of Truths*, and *aſſiſting Antichriſt*. For to juſtifie the *Grammaticalneſſe* of theſe words, [*Montaniſt who called himſelfe the holy Ghoſt*] a great deall of paines is taken, and 3 whole pages ſpent on that affair. 'Tis not poſſible I ſhould thinke fit to exerciſe my Reader by continuing ſuch a *Debate* as this any longer, but ſhall thinke it abundantly ſufficient to aſſure M. *G.* that the Engliſh remaines ſtill unjuſtified, upon this ground, that the word *Montaniſt* is no *poſſeſſive*, and if he ſtill have inclinations to diſpute it, I ſhall propoſe him this parallel: M. *Goodwin* is *a Chriſtian, who died for the ſinnes of the world*; and aske him, Whether it be *Grammaticall* ſenſe to have ſaid this. As for the deep recrimination againſt D.*H.* for uſing the word [*Reſolve*] for *concluding*, or *being ſatisfied within himſelfe, &c.* if this be any matter of *eaſe* or

refreſhment to M. *G.* 'twere pitty he ſhould be denied the *liberty* to make uſe of it.

§. 89. There now remaines but one particular, the Doctors *accuſing* M. *G. of flatterie* in the Elogies beſtowed upon that action of the Army, (collected in the *Addreſſe*, page 6.) Whether they were thus guiltie, I ſhall no farther diſpute, but leave it to the *Reader* to determine; having no other deſigne in this whole *reply*, then that M. *G.* may reſume the conſideration of his actions, and of his arguments, and remember that the matters of theſe debates are of ſuch an importance toward the publique peace, that men of our *profeſſion* owe an account to *God* for them. And for other paſſages of this *Authour*, wherein the *London-Miniſters* are concern'd, I leave them to anſwer for themſelves, and ſo conclude this Paper.

THE END.